Friday, February 15, 2013
By Guest Author, Ainsley Lloyd, Research Associate, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy
The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) featured prominently in the recent debate between Peter Foster and David Boyd in Financial Post (The nature debate part 1 and The nature debate part 2, January 25, 2013).
Over the past ten years the EPI has used measureable environmental information to rank countries based on their environmental performance. The EPI team from Yale and Columbia universities pores over data on the environment, comparing it with wealth, governance, and trade, among many other aspects of well being. First and foremost, we have learned that these relationships are complex, and that a few lines of text often lose the larger message in the data. The debate between Messrs. Foster and Boyd is no exception, and in this case, losing the message of the EPI means losing perspective on the nature of Canada’s environment and economy.
Wealth and the environment
Both Foster and Boyd reference theories on the relationship between wealth and the environment, with Foster arguing the two variables are correlated and Boyd questioning the strength of that relationship. The EPI provides some real-world insight.
EPI data show that although there is a relationship, a nation’s wealth only marginally explains its final EPI ranking. This means that there are other important factors influencing environmental performance. Put differently, economic development matters, but other factors are more important. Although we have not identified every variable, we are confident that environmental performance is not an accident of history and factors such as pragmatic and enforceable environmental safeguards are key.
Foster notes that Canada scores poorly in the overall EPI and blames our devotion “to official climate alarmism,” arguing that we weigh the Climate Change and Energy category of the EPI too heavily. While Canada does rank 102 out of 132 countries in the Climate Change and Energy analysis, Brunei Darussalam, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, and Taiwan all manage a better overall EPI rank with a lower Climate score. Furthermore, the Climate Change and Energy category actually receives less weight in the 2012 EPI than it did in 2010—a decrease from 25 percent of the overall EPI score to just 17.5 percent.
In addition, we have anticipated much of Foster’s climate-related concern by choosing CO2 emissions measures that account for his critiques— specifically, differences in wealth and in country size. The EPI indicators that address these concerns are CO2 per GDP (to account for differences in wealth between nations) and CO2 per capita (to account for differences in population size between nations). In the future, perhaps we can cut countries like Canada slack on account of higher latitudes and greater needs for heating—though energy needs for cooling in lower latitudes might balance the equation.
Foster is also concerned that our Environmental Health objective is not weighted as heavily in the final EPI score as its counterpart objective of Ecosystem Vitality. His concern is valid. Throughout the development of each edition of the EPI we consult with science and policy experts to fine-tune our methodology, and a departure from equal weights within the EPI framework is a signal that we have picked up on something important. It turns out that equal weights do not necessarily mean equal influence (something we discuss briefly in the blog post “the Science and Art of Quantification” and in our upcoming manual “How to Build Green Indices: Learning from the Experience of the Environmental Performance Index”).
For the 2012 EPI, a 50-50 weighting for Environmental Health and Ecosystem Vitality meant that the overall EPI scores were too heavily influenced by performance in the Environmental Health objective alone because of its wider distribution. Countries that perform high in the Environmental Health objective were likely to perform better in the overall EPI, regardless of their scores in Ecosystem Vitality. Both Health and Ecosystems are important and we adjusted the EPI weightings to correct for this imbalance.
Finally, Mr. Foster brushes off the significance of the Environmental Performance Index because of its “murky metrics.” The response here does not require any complicated analysis. Our entire process, from data to methods to the final ranking, is entirely available online and is free and open to the public. Nothing could be less murky. Any journalist, researcher, or policymaker who wishes to dive in is more than welcome, and we are here to help.
On that note, to Messrs. Foster and Boyd: we would like to invite you both to serve on our expert panel for the 2014 EPI. You’ll find that it’s a dynamic group of scientists and practitioners, ready for debate, eager to prepare the best set of tools possible for policymakers.
Monday, February 11, 2013
By Guest Author, Omar Malik, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies '13, Research Assistant, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy
An article in a recent issue of The Economist suggests that putting effort into domestic climate change legislation is more important than pushing international climate agreements right now. The piece describes the results of a new study that assesses whether the climate change policies of 33 countries have improved, gotten worse, or remained the same as of the end of 2012. The encouraging results indicate that domestic policy action is happening even in the absence of a mandated treaty structure.
This ought to bring hope to environmentalists who advocate for a more decentralized approach to climate change policies. It should also appeal to those who bemoan the apparent political impasses of the international U.N. climate negotiations.
The new study—the third in a series by GLOBE international—was extolled by Christiana Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, the U.N. body that coordinates global climate change agreements. She attended the release party for the report in London this January and issued an official statement, in which she said, “[D]omestic legislation on climate is the absolutely critical, essential linchpin between action at the national level and international agreements.” At the same time, she remarked that the ultimate goal of the study should be that it paves the way for the next U.N. climate treaty that’s supposed to be agreed upon by 2015, to take effect by 2020.
The U.S. National Climate Assessment report came out just as recently from the U.S. government. Also in its third iteration, the Assessment is open for public review until April 2013. Perhaps in a complementary way to the GLOBE study, the US Assessment focuses more on the science and evidence of climate change for one particular country and broadly touches upon the policy situation as well. Similarly, the conclusion of the report states that more U.S. policy action is necessary, but that concerted global actions would be the best way to go forward.
Both reports seem to suggest, then, that domestic policies are necessary, but not sufficient, to achieving the ultimate goals of climate action.
This is a familiar problem in the global climate policy debate: should governance move from the top down or the bottom up to reach desired outcomes? And, should success rely on individualistic actions or, rather, support from movements in concert? These tensions are the fuel for geopolitics and have led to both progress and paradox.
The need for harmonized policies in the face of trying times reminds me of a passage in The Federalist. John Jay, writing to newspapers in 1787 to argue for the adoption of the new Constitution, argued that it’s beneficial for a central government, when concerned about national defense, to “move on uniform principles of policy.” The case certainly has been made for treating climate change as an issue of national security; many politicians have already argued that climate change poses that kind of threat to the United States (both John Kerry and the US Navy have issued public statements). In this case, perhaps its management should be approached in terms of coordinated policies with the kind of logic articulated in The Federalist:
Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.
--John Jay (Federalist No. 4, available online http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed04.asp)
As John Jay tells us, these debates are not new. The new climate reports show that the world’s countries do behave in the manner similar to Voltaire’s Candide, tending their own gardens; but, at the same, the reports remind countries to keep in mind that the end goal is to use those piecemeal gardens to make the wider world greener.
The Economist. “Climate-change laws: Beginning at home.” 19 January 2013.
BBC News. “Climate change measures: Report praises politicians.” 13 January 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20983931
The 3rd Climate Legislation Study from the Global Legislators Organisation (GLOBE International).
Available here: http://www.globeinternational.org/images/climate-study/3rd_GLOBE_Report.pdf
Homepage of GLOBE International: http://www.globeinternational.org/index.php/legislation-policy/studies/climate
UNFCCC statement from Christiana Figueres. 13 January 2013. http://unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/pdf/201314011_globe_international.pdf
The U.S. National Climate Assessment, draft for public review. 2012.
Friday, February 01, 2013
By Josh Galperin
A conservation easement is a legally binding agreement that prevents most development on a parcel of land. For instance, a landowner might place a conservation easement on their undeveloped waterfront property, requiring that the property is never developed for commercial purposes. The easement is a tool that has long been an important part of environmental protection, but it does have its downside: typically a property is taxed based on its highest possible use, not on its actual use. A swath of land on the outskirts of a city center, for example, has enormous value as a commercial development. The land may be undeveloped and producing no income, but the owner must still pay taxes for the high commercial value. This tax liability incentivizes development because landowners need to pay taxes one way or another.
In 2008 the Santa Fe Conservation Trust in New Mexico was faced with this very problem. The Trust became the new owners of a pristine parcel of land in the Pecos River Canyon in San Miguel County and their ownership included a conservation easement requiring them to hold and maintain the property for conservation purposes. The tax department wanted to assess taxes on the land, but the Trust pointed out that New Mexico’s constitution has a unique provision which states that “all property used for… charitable purposes… shall be exempt from taxation.”
On January 11, 2013 a court in New Mexico agreed with the Santa Fe Conservation Trust that environmental conservation is a charitable use, which provides a substantial benefit to the public. As such, the Trust is not required to pay any property taxes on this property.
This particular rule—that land held for conservation purposes may be exempt from all property tax—is unique to New Mexico, but the way in which it incentivizes conservation should still be good news to environmentalists. The way in which it further reduces taxation should be good news to tax-averse conservatives.
Tuesday, January 29, 2013
By Bruce Ho
On Wednesday, January 23, Mark Boling, President of V+ Development Solutions, a division of Southwestern Energy Company, kicked off the spring line-up of our 2012-2013 Policy Workshop Webinar Series on Emerging Issues in Shale Gas Development with a presentation on “Balancing Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts of Shale Gas Development Activities.”
In his presentation, Mr. Boling provided both a defense for continued shale gas development and an acknowledgment that the gas industry needs to do a better job, on the whole, of acknowledging and addressing legitimate environmental concerns. Toward this end, he discussed Southwestern’s efforts to: (1) study the rate of methane leakage from shale gas wells in collaboration with the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and others (their final report is due out soon); (2) work with EDF to develop and promote a model regulatory framework for states to ensure proper well integrity; (3) develop improved well cementing technology with the University of Houston and CSI Technologies; (4) with help from The Nature Conservancy, train employees and contractors to reduce erosion and sedimentation impacts from project sites; and (5) develop new tracer technology with Rice University to help detect hydraulic fracturing fluids if they migrate into groundwater.
You can watch Mr. Boling’s full presentation below, in which he further discusses Southwestern’s views on the shale gas debate and the company’s vision of environmental responsibility and regulation.
Balancing Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts of Shale Gas Development Activities from YCELP on Vimeo.
In listening to Mr. Boling’s presentation and his responses during the subsequent Q&A, three things struck me as particularly important issues for regulatory discussions:
(1) “A Level Playing Field” – Mr. Boling noted that Southwestern strongly supports adoption of the model regulatory framework that it has developed with EDF. But he also stressed the need for a level playing field, suggesting that even companies interested in doing “the right thing” may hesitate to implement best environmental practices if doing so makes them less competitive. Companies may not always seek the lowest denominator – Mr. Boling noted that many implement best practices that go beyond regulatory minimums – but without effective regulatory safeguards, economic pressures will make it difficult if not impossible to address environmental concerns fully, even with good actors.
(2) “Straight Talk” About Regulations – In discussing what he sees as a need to “refocus the debate,” Mr. Boling recommended that his industry spend less time trying to minimize public concerns and more time communicating about the real risks involved in shale gas development and what the industry is doing to mitigate these risks. For example, during the Q&A, Mr. Boling noted that he has split with those in his industry who argue that “green completions,” which help reduce or eliminate air pollutant emissions from new shale gas wells, are too costly. New regulations adopted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) last year will require green completions of all new hydraulically fractured wells by the year 2015, though Southwestern has begun this process early by participating in EPA’s Natural Gas STAR Program. Mr. Boling noted that a few years ago, green completions cost his company $20,000 more per well than simply venting pollutants to the air, but these costs have since fallen significantly, and now green completions are often profitable investments because they capture natural gas that can be sold rather than wasted. Notably, these economic benefits are purely private and do not take into account the additional public benefits that arise from reduced air and climate pollution.
Companies such as Southwestern deserve credit for leading environmentally through the Natural Gas STAR Program and other such initiatives. Southwestern’s experience also reinforces the observation that the costs of regulatory compliance are often much less than originally anticipated as new technologies and solutions develop or become cheaper to implement over time (see, e.g., here, here, and here).
(3) Politics and Science – Mr. Boling lamented what he sees as too much politics in shale gas regulation and not enough regulation based on sound science and risk assessments. The goal of science-based (or scientifically informed) regulation is a good one, and it is true that some parties on both sides of the shale gas debate have stretched the science too far in support of their agendas. As more research is published – including studies involving Southwestern – these data will hopefully contribute to an improved public understanding of shale gas’ environmental risks and impacts as well as its potential benefits.
But it is also true that science cannot, on its own, determine the best regulatory approach when faced with uncertainty or questions of socially acceptable levels of risk. Decisions about whether to move forward with resource development or to wait for science (and policy) to catch up to practice are inherently political, and thus politics will continue to play a role in determining how shale gas fits into the future energy mix.
In the context of climate change, for example, it is indisputable, scientifically, that burning fossil fuels, including shale gas, contributes to a warming planet. Yet there is a debate as to whether shale gas will exacerbate this warming in the long run or instead help reduce the total warming by helping transition us away from coal and, eventually, to carbon-free energy. Ultimately, the outcome of political decisions about energy investments and environmental risks will determine whether the former or the latter is true. Sound science, including climate science, must be a key component of these decisions, but resource outcomes and policies are rarely pure questions of scientific fact. Politics will play a role.
Next Time in Emerging Issues in Shale Gas Development
The Emerging Issues in Shale Gas Development webinar series will continue on Tuesday, February 12, from 2-3pm EST with a presentation by Jeffrey Logan from the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) on “The Role of Natural Gas in U.S. Electric Power Futures.” Mr. Logan will present research from a report he recently co-authored through the Joint Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis, an initiative between NREL, the University of Colorado-Boulder, the Colorado School of Mines, Colorado State, M.I.T., and Stanford.
To register for this webinar, please click here. As always, the webinar will be free and open to the public, but registration is required to participate.
By Guest Author, William Miao, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies '14
The tiny island nation of New Zealand once again received a disproportionally large amount of media attention when the prominent and widely respected economist, Gareth Morgan, revealed his solution for saving the country's dwindling diversity and abundance of native birds: banning all cats, household or feral, in the entire country. His reason is simple. Cats are natural-born serial-killers of native birds – they have contributed to the extinction of nine birds species -- so eliminating these furry mammals would save the avian population from ruthless paws and jaws. The controversial campaign – “Cats to Go” – has been widely reported in global media outlets such as New York Times and Huffington Post.
Proponents of the proposal underscore the necessity of protecting native species at all costs, and the naysayers ridicule this idea as radical and “over-the-top.” As the New Zealander-in-residence at the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP), I have been asked on numerous occasions for my position on this issue. This blog is my response (and everybody can stop bothering me now).
While I agree with Morgan on the potential benefits of his proposal, I have my reservations. My reason is also simple: it is not because I hate the native birds. In fact, I have supported their conservation efforts for a long time through volunteering on an offshore bird sanctuary island. Rather, I am simply unsure about the practicality of a non-differentiating, nationwide feline ban, especially given the potential scale of the policy instruments required to implement the ban, as well as the constraints on the current political resources.
For those not familiar with New Zealand, the country has one of the highest cat ownership rates on the planet, with 28 percent of households owning one cat, and a further 20 percent owning two or more. This means cats form an integral part of nearly half of the families in New Zealand. The fact that cats as pets can provide intimate and tangible comforts and joy is deeply ingrained in this country’s culture. In contrast, the native birds are generally more elusive, and the more intangible ecosystem services they provide are very poorly appreciated by everyday New Zealanders. So I suspect that many more people would value the companionship of their cats over the existence of some native bird species that they probably will never see, as sad and cruel as this may sound. And, unfortunately, this conflict of personal and societal interests likely would make the ban very unpopular among the mainstream, at least in the short-term. As a matter of fact, despite the international publicity, a week into its launch Morgan’s campaign has only managed to attract around 2,000 signatures, equivalent to 0.04 percent of NZ’s already small population.
From the government’s perspective, it is wise not to invest limited resources in policies unlikely to attract supports. Furthermore, alternative bird-saving options are available and are far less controversial: elimination of other predators such as possums and weasels, implementation of breeding programs, construction of pest-free sanctuaries, just to name a few. If these bird species remain endangered, the government could even consider striking a middle ground and impose some type of cat controls, such as restricting household cats to indoors while eliminating feral cats, for example. Conversely, a single-minded pursuit of a “home-run” is, in my mind, counterproductive, and will likely end in a lose-lose situation for both the campaigners and the birds they are trying to protect.
Interested in invasive species management? Attend the YCELP’s panel discussion, “Eating Invaders: A Panel Discussion on Invasive Species”, which will be held at Yale Law School at 6:10 pm on February 13.
William Miao is a first-year Master of Environmental Management (MEM' 14) candidate at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. His research focus is on the application of integrated environmental tools and frameworks at corporate, industrial, and national levels. Originally a chemical engineer from Auckland, New Zealand, his previous work involved risk management for oil and gas production, waste to energy research, and life-cycle assessment for the steel industry.
Thursday, January 24, 2013
By Josh Galperin
20 years ago, along State Road 50 in Orange County, Florida, land developer Coy Koontz proposed to fill 3.7 acres of wetlands in order to build a commercial center. At the time, the local water management district agreed to permit the project if Mr. Koontz would agree to preserve the remaining 11 acres of wetlands on his property and, in order to further mitigate the wetlands he would fill, to contribute approximately $10,000 to improve a separate wetland preserve several miles away. Mr. Koontz refused this arrangement, as well as several others proposed by the district, and instead sued, claiming that the district’s refusal to issue him an unconditional permit constituted an impermissible government taking of his property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Over the last two decades, despite Mr. Koontz’ death, this case found its way from the wetlands of central Florida to the United States Supreme Court, with Mr. Koontz’s son, Coy Koontz, Jr., taking over for his father.
The environmental implications of this particular case are clear: Wetlands, which are sometimes called the “kidneys” of watersheds for their water purification functions and which also provide important wildlife habitats, are an essential environmental resource and this case involves the question of when and how Mr. Koontz can destroy wetlands on his property. However, the really interesting aspects of this case are in the details of the legal theory.
I. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
Mr. Koontz claimed that by failing to issue him a development permit, the government had “taken” his property. Among other things, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution says “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This means that the government may take private property from individuals on two conditions. First, the government may take the property only for a public use, such as a road, a school, or environmental protection. Second, when the government does take private property for public use, it must offer the property owner compensation for the land taken.
A. Taking by Eminent Domain
Over the years this constitutional clause has given rise to several distinct types of takings. Eminent domain is the most traditional means of taking private property for public use. With eminent domain, the government will go to a court and tell the court that it wants to take ownership of private land. As long as the purpose of the eminent domain is public and the compensation is fair, the court will transfer ownership from the private owner to the government.
B. Taking by Regulation
A regulatory taking is an alternative method of taking private property. This occurs when the government does not plan or intend to take ownership of private property, as it does with eminent domain, but instead regulates the property owners’ use of his or her property to such an extent that the government is essentially forcing the property into public use. For example, where a state regulation prohibited a mining company from extracting any coal that was under a residential building because mining would cause the building to collapse, the Supreme Court ruled that there had been a regulatory taking. The Court found that the regulation prohibited the company from using part of its property and that the state, in an effort to protect private homes from coal mining, had gone “too far”. 
A later Supreme Court case helped explain, but did not completely resolve, how to determine when a regulation goes too far. In this later case, the Court developed what is now called the Penn Central test, which says that whether there is a regulatory taking depends on: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct, investment-backed expectations of the property owner; and (3) the character of the government action.  Unfortunately, in the nearly 40 years since the Court laid out the Penn Central test, it is still unclear exactly how to interpret and apply the details.
Some regulatory takings, however, are easy to identify because they are categorical. That is, they involve much less balancing and judgment. When a government regulation forces a permanent invasion of property, no matter how small that invasion, it is a taking, as was the case when a regulation forced building owners to allow cable companies to run wire across their roofs.  Likewise, when a regulation completely removes any private economic benefit of property, that is a “total taking” and the Constitution requires compensation. For example, a South Carolina law required a special permit to develop in a critical coastal area. When the government would not issue a permit to a beachfront property owner, the Supreme Court said that stopping development is permissible, but as long as the government requires the landowner to preserve his property for public environmental purposes, it must pay him just compensation. The court explained that by denying the permit, the government denied the landowner any economically beneficial use of his land. In other words, where a regulation causes property to have only a public benefit, and no benefit to the private landowner, there has been total taking. 
C. Taking by Exaction
Finally, there is a category of taking called an exaction. An exaction occurs when the government conditions issuance of a development permit on the developer giving up some smaller piece of property. Where a homeowner wants to build a new beachfront house, but the government will only issue a permit if the homeowner allows pedestrians to cross his property; that is an exaction. It is a taking of the small piece of property across which the pedestrians will walk.  And if a hardware store wants to expand its parking lot but the government will only issue a permit if the storeowner gives up a portion of her property for a bike path, that too is an exaction. It is a taking of the land that will become a bike path. 
Not all permit conditions, however, are exactions. First, to be an exaction, such a condition must require the dedication of property to public use. Second, a permit condition is permissible and is not a taking if the condition is closely related to the harm that that the permitted action will cause. The condition must be related in both its nature and its size. For example, when the beachfront homeowner builds a new home, that development has nothing to do with pedestrian beach access, so the pedestrian crossing does not have what the Supreme Court calls an “essential nexus” with the new development.  In contrast, a storeowner expanding her parking lot, does have a connection with traffic and commuting, so a bike path across the property does have an essential nexus. However, according to the Court, the traffic impact of a few additional parking spots is insignificant and is not weighty enough to warrant the dedication of private property for a bike path. The Court calls this test one of “rough proportionality”; the impact of requiring the landowner to establish a bike path is not roughly proportional to the impacts of the parking lot.
At first, because the case of Coy Koontz is about permit conditions, it appears to concern only this last category of takings: exactions. But in fact, the case raises questions about the broad spectrum of takings law.
II. Takings in the Context of Koontz
A. Has There Been an Exaction?
For the sake of argument, the Supreme Court might take the facts of Mr. Koontz’s case and decide that there is an exaction. They would of course look at the requirement that Mr. Koontz dedicate his undeveloped wetlands for preservation and that he contribute money to the preservation of additional wetlands and the Court would have to agree that there is an essential nexus between wetland destruction and wetlands preservation. However, they might decide that the harm done by filling a few acres of wetlands is not roughly proportional to the requirement of preserving and paying for so many additional acres. Under this reasoning the Court could decide that there has been an exaction and that compensation is due
In the exaction cases described above, the owners sued the government after the government issued permits requiring dedication of the walking path beside the beachfront home and the bike path next to the hardware store. But in this case Koontz sued the government for denying his permit. Because the government never issued a permit, there was no requirement forcing Koontz to do anything with his money or wetlands. The government never forced Koontz to dedicate his property to the public good. Thus, as Mr. Koontz sues, seeking compensation for the exactions, the Court cannot ignore the fact that there never was an exaction, the government cannot compensate for something it has not taken, or for a requirement that does not exist.
When the Supreme Court listened to arguments in this case Justice Sotomayor listened to Koontz’s explanation of this case and found herself wondering, “Why are we even in this case? Why are we here?” Justice Scalia, often the greatest champion of strict property rights, expressed the same concern, pointing out that the government never took anything in this case. Given the skepticism of the Court, it seems that Koontz’s exaction theory may fail.
But perhaps other takings theories could rescue this case. Realistically, Mr. Koontz’s presented his case to the Supreme Court only on the exaction argument, so it is doubtful that the Court would address other theories. However, in the past decades and already this term, the Court has been inclined to rule in favor of complaining landowners, so an exploration of Koontz’s other constitutional and policy options is worthwhile.
B. Other Takings Theories
Mr. Koontz might argue that there has been a regulatory taking insofar as the government has denied Mr. Koontz all use of his land for commercial development. This argument has previously prevailed before the Court, as was the case, mentioned above, of the South Carolina landowner who was denied a permit to build on his beachfront property. However, in that case the Supreme Court considered the permit denial to be a regulatory taking because it left the landowner without any reasonably beneficial economic use of his land. That simply is not the case for Mr. Koontz. Coy Koontz can still build an economically significant commercial development on his property. Admittedly, Mr. Koontz can only build this development if he is also willing to preserve and improve various wetlands at what may be a non-negligible cost to him. But the economic opportunity to develop the parcel even with the proposed restrictions is also very real, and an argument that there has been a complete loss of value rather than only a partial reduction in value is unsound.
Mr. Koontz might then argue that there has been a regulatory taking under the three-part Penn Central test. This argument also faces an uphill battle. The Court might find, for example, that when the government denies a permit because the landowner is not willing to accept conditions, that the “character of the government action”, specifically, the possibly extortionate conditions, should lead to a regulatory taking and compensation. On the other hand, the conditions probably do not have a major economic impact compared to the value of the proposed development, nor do the conditions interfere with Koontz’s investment-backed expectations because he still stands to make a significant profit on the development, regardless of the conditions. More importantly, the Supreme Court has never found a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test.
Koontz’s final argument might then fall from a constitutional argument to a policy argument. It is unfair, he might argue, that he must choose between what he sees as the lesser of two evils. He can refuse, as he did, to accept the permit conditions and the government will deny the permit, but then he cannot win on the constitutional merits. If he wants to succeed on a constitutional exactions argument he will have to concede to a permit with conditions he does not like and then sue the government as the beachfront homeowner or the hardware store owner did. Koontz’s policy argument would be that he should not have to wait for an unconstitutional act in order to get his justice. But this argument should also fail because it sets up a false dichotomy.
Mr. Koontz would want the court to sympathize with his untenable situation. Either he accepts an unconstitutional permit or he stands up for his principal but is then prohibited from getting justice. The flaw in this argument is that even if there were an exaction in this case, an exaction is not unconstitutional. Takings in general are not unconstitutional; they merely require compensation. This is the very purpose of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The government may take property, whether by eminent domain, regulatory takings or exactions, as long as the government pays compensation. If Mr. Koontz were faced with a permit that denied his freedom of speech or religion, then his choice would raise constitutional sympathies. When his choice is between making a lot of money or making a lot of money and spending a little to protect the environment, the Constitution does not prohibit permit conditions.
III. Takings and Environmental Protection
Through the Takings Clause, the United States Constitution strikes a balance between a severe and inflexible purity of private property and the logical inevitability that in democratic society property owners must, to some degree, consent to limited governmental interference. Although this is the consensus embodied in the Fifth Amendment it is not welcome to strict property rights advocates.
The alternative is not a welcome to environmental protection advocates. Whether it is wetlands or coalmines, flood protection or toxic remediation, environmental safeguards frequently bear on the private use of land. If the Court is to further expand the scope of the Takings Clause, the requirement of compensation could make environmental protection impractically expensive. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District presents the Court with an opportunity to reject a further broadening of the scope of takings law and to avoid putting environmental safeguards—already in political jeopardy—in greater legal and economic jeopardy.
 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 548 U.S. 419 (1982).
 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 482 U.S. 825 (1987).
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 482 U.S. 825 (1987).
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Tuesday, January 22, 2013
By Guest Author, Nathaniel Loewentheil, Yale Law School '13
The following is a guest post by Yale Law Student Nathaniel Loewentheil. Nathaniel recently authored a report for the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, which this post summarizes. You can find the full report here.
Two new reports out from NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration add to the ponderous weight of evidence suggesting that our climate is changing more rapidly than we had anticipated – and with greater consequences.
This makes for reconciling two difficult truths: first, that climate change is already affecting all of our lives, and second, that our national political institutions are doing nothing to address it. They’re not now, and they won’t be for the next few years. The environmental movement is almost completely sidelined by a recalcitrant and increasingly conservative Republican Party and, we must admit, a public concerned more with daily economic necessities than long-term ecological challenges. When that movement will again be able to capture public attention is difficult to say.
In the meantime, the movement is biding its time and plotting strategy for the future. Before it looks forward, however, it must necessarily look back at the most recent climate campaign: the failed push for a cap-and-trade bill in 2009 and 2010.
In a new report out this week from Yale’s Institution for Social and Policy Studies, I take a look at that climate campaign using historical trends in political parties, voting records, natural resource distribution and a variety of other indicators.
The report has two key findings. First, and unsurprisingly, there were a variety of forces that together blocked cap-and-trade legislation, from energy interests and political geography to polarization and the recession.
But, I believe, defeat was not inevitable.
To see this, all we have to do is look at the Affordable Care Act of 2010. The fact that a major healthcare reform bill got through Congress suggests that the climate movement might have succeeded, recession and the Tea Party notwithstanding.
Comparing the two campaigns, a key difference emerges. The healthcare campaign succeeded by combining a sophisticated insider strategy with large-scale organizing. The climate campaign, in sharp contrast, had an insider strategy only. Through the US Climate Action Partnership, organizations like Environmental Defense Fund and Natural Resource Defense Council built an impressive coalition of NGOs and corporations and laid out the policy framework ultimately embedded in the Waxman-Markey bill. But the campaign didn’t build a grassroots network or attempt to win over public opinion. In this, it erred dramatically.
I also looked back at the history of environmental policymaking, from the Wilderness Act of 1964 up through the Superfund Act of the late 1980s. In case after case, the same lesson was clear: major environmental legislation can only succeed when an organized movement makes demands and the public voices its approval. Lacking both street power and endorsement by the polls, the climate campaign was doomed to a slow death in the Senate.
The bright side is that a careful analysis of the failure of the climate campaign provides a clear lesson for the future. The movement needs to begin investing in local and state organizations that can build a strong, enduring network of activists ready to spring into action the next time a realistic climate bill is on the table. Organizing, of course, is built around action – and now is a good moment to be running campaigns at the municipal and state level for energy efficiency measures and tax breaks for green technology.
But that’s not enough. The movement also needs to begin shifting public opinion. And to that end, we need a new generation of journalists who, like Rachel Carson, can capture the hearts of Americans, not just their minds.
Read the full report here.
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
By Guest Author, Angel Hsu and William Miao, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy
Beijing’s air quality once again is making international headlines for off-the-chart measurements of air pollution. Images of Beijing show China’s capital city completely shrouded in gloomy shades of grey. According to Jan. 12 readings of the city’s official real-time air quality monitoring platform, air pollution levels exceeded the upper limit of 500 on the Air Quality Index (click here to read an explanation of China’s newly adopted AQI) in many of Beijing’s districts, meaning that air pollution was beyond “hazardous” levels. The US Embassy in Beijing, which has been independently monitoring air pollution since the 2008 Olympics, independently measured and reported AQI values topping 755 .
Infographic created by Monte Kawahara
The most significant contributing pollutant by far, as reported by both the Chinese and US measuring capacities, is fine particulate matter, or PM 2.5. Readings that topped 500 in November 2010 prompted a US Embassy official to tweet that the air was “crazy bad,” although this outtake was quickly recinded.
PM 2.5 – Small Particle, Big Threat
PM 2.5 represents fine particles suspended in the air with a diameter of less than 2.5 microns (about one thirtieth of the width of human hair). Particles of this size are capable of passing through the respiratory track and remaining in the human lungs, causing a range of short-term and chronic conditions such as asthma, lung cancer, and cardiovascular disease.
So how PM 2.5 being measured and reflected in air quality indices, communicated by both the U.S. Embassy and Chinese government? Last March the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) released new national air quality standards and an index, the AQI, for communicating air quality that was more consistent with U.S. standards. The main difference between the Chinese and U.S. AQIs for PM 2.5 is the pollutant concentration thresholds used. While the U.S has adopted a PM 2.5 concentration threshold close to the World Health Organization (WHO)’s recommended levels of 10 μg/m3, China has opted for thresholds similar to the interim guidelines the WHO has set for developing countries.[JG1]
In Table 1, above, we see US and China AQI breakpoints for PM10 and PM 2.5. Note that the descriptions in column 2 are based on the Chinese AQI standards, not US standards.
Because the official AQI measurements are capped at 500, the real extent of PM 2.5 concentrations citizens faced this past weekend in Beijing are understated. In fact, the PM 2.5 readings of all regions across the city in the evening of Jan. 12 were above 700 μg/m3, peaking at 993 μg/m3) When the US Embassy reported AQI values above 500 some asked whether their monitors were broken.
When the US Embassy air monitor started reporting values above 500, some thought these were measurement errors, as the upper-end of the AQI only reaches 500. How were AQI values beyond 500 determined? Vance Wagner, a long-time Beijing air quality analyst, wrote a post explaining the linear estimation of the AQI beyond 500, demonstrating that the US monitor uses the relationship for concentration levels at 400 μg/m3 to 500 μg/m3.
In figure 2, above, we see the relationship between PM 2.5 concentrations and AQI. The red line is based on the China AQI, while the blue is interpolated values used by the US Embassy monitor AQI. Note that the official PM 2.5 concentration to IAQI conversion isn’t linear, an online calculator is available to perform the conversion.
Therefore, the equivalent-AQI of 755 reported by the US Embassy’s monitor, would have corresponded to a PM 2.5 concentration of 668 μg/m3. As a comparison, UN WHO recommends a safe level of PM 2.5 of 15 μg/m3, with an interim goal of 75 μg/m3.
These highly hazardous levels of PM 2.5 have prompted Chinese authorities to urge all residents to remain indoors and to order schools to cancel outdoor activities for children.
What’s Causing the Scale-tipping Smog?
Beijing’s air quality is the result of a complex interaction of many climactic, geographic, and anthropogenic factors. Here are some of the explanations set forth to explain why air quality is so hazardous:
· Winter weather conditions and “haze”: According the official Chinese news channel, China Daily, the main reason for such record-setting pollution is lingering fog and haze. The article states, “Experts and residents in the worst-hit areas such as Shijiazhuang are becoming increasingly worried about the air pollution brought by frequent winter haze.” In the same article, Ma Xuekuan from the National Meteorological Center attributed the formation of fog and haze to the wet air, little wind, and stable atmosphere conditions common in winter. Hazy, humid and stagnant air are perfect for trapping pollutants such as fine particles, which lead to the smog. While there is logic to this explanation, as Beijing lacks precipitation during the winter months and a few days without wind prevents pollutants from being blown away, the weather and natural causes can’t be entirely to blame for off-the-charts pollution. Even long-term residents are shocked by the recent smog levels.
· Heating from coal-fired power plants. Around 80 percent of China’s power comes from coal-fired power plants, although Beijing does have plans to eliminate the capitol’s coal plants by 2020.
· Increasing car ownership. Beijing now has 5 million vehicles, and the number is increasing. Authorities are now owning upto these staggering statistics and are beginning to think of more aggressive measures to curb emissiosn from vehicles.
· Industrial activities in neighboring provinces. Beijing is bordered by Shandong and Hebei provinces, which are some of the most industrially intensive provinces in China. In 2011, according to official Chinese Statistics, Shandong had the third-highest industrial output GDP, while Hebei came in sixth.
· Agricultural biomass burning. While it is unlikely that the severe pollution in Beijing this month is due to agricultural burning because January is not a harvest month, extreme air pollution last May in Wuhan was due to multiple fires of burning biomass, which puts a significant amount of dust, soot, and particulate matter in the atmosphere.
What can be done?
While China’s recent move to release PM 2.5 data for 74 major cities in China, with more plans to release data for all 113 key environmental protection cities by the end of this year, the beyond 500 AQI readings have called into question whether China should revise its AQI to account for pollution levels beyond the index. The meaningfulness of an index that reads “beyond Index” in determining the severity of air pollution is questionable. Our observations of the MEP’s official PM 2.5 data in previous months show that air pollution is not as severe on a daily basis for all of China. However, considerations for increasing the scale beyond 500 would be helpful for situations like we’re seeing now.
The good news is that the Chinese government is being more responsive and transparent than they have in the past. The government has been more open to official media reports covering the severity of air pollution and to citizens publicly airing grievances in media outlets. However, the more challenging task will be how the government can take this momentum and translate it quickly into enforcable policies addressing the root causes of the pollution, instead of shifting blame to uncontrollable, natural factors like wind or climate.
Monday, January 14, 2013
By Josh Galperin
InsideClimate News reported on Friday that the New York Times is closing its environment desk. The Times confirmed this report and explains that the move is not a signal that they are moving resources away from environmental reporting. It is, they say, simply newsroom restructuring. Nonetheless, the move touches a nerve since the dramatic decline of the newspaper industry has been hard on environmental journalism.
The overall decline in the newspaper industry has been snowballing for some time. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in September 2012 that total employment in the newspaper industry declined by more than 40 percent over the 10-year period from 2001 to 2011. The New York Times itself had 12,050 employees at the close of 2001. By the close of 2011 Times employment dropped to 7,273 amounting to just under a 40-percent decline.
Environmental reporting may be particularly vulnerable to this upending of the newspaper industry. A study from 2008 found that about 555 daily newspapers had a dedicated environmental reporter in in 2000. By 2008 that number fell below 300. Symptomatic of this decline, Columbia University suspended in 2009 its graduate program in environmental journalism, noting that the weak job market was the primary driver.
The New York Times describes its newsroom shift as an attempt to promote interdisciplinarity, attributing a change in the nature of environmental journalism from 2009 to today’s “pre-fracking and pre-economic collapse” world. To their mind, environmental journalism was “singular and isolated” in 2009 when the Times opened its environment desk. Not to suggest that the Times is giving up on environmental reporting, but this explanation is absurd. Fracking and the economic situation are certainly high-profile issues in 2013, but in 2009 one could have said the very same thing about the economic situation or healthcare reform or swine flu.
No single issue changes the nature of environmental journalism and, in any case, reassigning environmental reporters to other subjects does not create interdisciplinarity, it creates distraction. Good environmental reporting is difficult because scientific issues are complex by nature. The science may be difficult to summarize and its real-world implications—in other words, its inherent interdisciplinarity—spans a number of areas, from economics to politics and many others. A reporter’s ability to specialize should make reporting the connections easier, not harder. By removing the structural focus on a single area of reporting, an editor is more likely to direct a reporter’s focus away from the important environmental news and instead toward high-profile issues. In 2012 fracking was one, but so was the divorce of Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes.
Wednesday, January 02, 2013
By Guest Author, Lia Nicholson, Yale F&ES '14
Doha, the capital of Qatar, is a glamorous construction – built entirely over the last 50 years – with an extravagant skyline where desert dunes meet the Persian Gulf. Attending the world’s biggest climate meeting there, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was a surreal experience. The glamor of the convention center, the deference with which our hosts treated the 9,000 COP participants, and the adrenaline needed to keep up with the chaotic schedule distracted me from the reality of the situation: we were convened to negotiate an existential threat.
With support from the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP), I had the good fortune of attending the convention and I did it wearing two hats. The objectives of each hat were even somewhat contradictory in nature, which, in the end, reflected my conflicting sentiments toward the multilateral climate negotiations and particularly the role of small island states.
I am enrolled in an environmental protection clinic at Yale Law School, and I work with Islands First, a New York-based non-profit organization with a small staff and a mammoth objective: to build the capacity of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), one of the groups most vulnerable to climate change. A conundrum of the negotiation process is that the most vulnerable countries generally have the least capacity to influence the negotiations. Small island countries, for example, may arrive with a delegation of six while the United States arrives with a delegation of 75. The diplomatic schedule is as demanding as it is confounding with plenaries, informals, informal informals, and drafting groups occurring simultaneously in multiple tracks, small delegations struggle to leverage their voice. Islands First helps to remediate this discrepancy by coordinating extra hands and interns such as myself to cover AOSIS priority meetings and provide research as needed. By strengthening representation, Islands First strives to bring about meaningful environmental policy reform.
In addition to my role with Islands First, I was at COP to organize an event that explored alternative routes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, culminating a semester of research by students in the Yale Law School course, “Climate Change and the International Court of Justice”. The Ambassadors for Responsibility on Climate Change, or ARC, in 2011 began an initiative to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The initiative sought a judicial opinion to define a state’s responsibility to reduce harmful greenhouse gas emissions based on established international legal concepts, including the precautionary principle and the prevention of transboundary harm (for an explanation of these legal concepts, please see Christophe Schwarte’s presentation and the ICJ summary brochure).
The event featured presentations on this subject from four diverse panelists (bios provided below). ARC member Ambassador Lima of Cape Verde brought a humanitarian vision that emphasized, “We are all neighbors with joined doors” as a reminder to value solidarity. The Ambassador referenced the extreme vulnerability of small islands and least developed countries as constituting a right to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on state responsibility to reduce emissions.
Attorney Christophe Schwarte, executive director of the Legal Response Initiative (LRI), presented an expert’s technical evaluation of the initiative. His critical appraisal recognized that an ICJ advisory opinion is not the “silver bullet” to reducing emissions. However, the presentation’s message was that the initiative passes the legal litmus test for an audience before the ICJ. Schwarte concluded that the action would have important benefits, such as increasing public awareness and responsibility, activating political pressure, and establishing “building blocks” for principles of international environmental law, particularly in relation to the atmosphere.
For Professor Michael Dorsey, the ICJ initiative embodies proactive action to reinvigorate the “low-intensity, politically possible, morally bankrupt conversations” of climate negotiations. This revision of the negotiation process could be achieved through an ICJ opinion that, if favorable, could create a paradigm shift towards a new international norm against greenhouse gases.
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies’ student Dustin Schinn explained why an advisory opinion would be in the interest of all nations, including the biggest polluters and particularly the United States. An advisory opinion, Dustin explained, would reinforce the rule of law in responding to the international threat of climate change, and in the past the U.S. has been a proponent of such interventions. Furthermore, the economic costs of inactions in addition to the threat of climate change to international security and by extension U.S. national interest call for timely and effective action.
The four diverse perspectives – humanitarian, activist, student, and legal expert – resulted in a thought-provoking dialogue, evidenced in the post-presentation enthusiasm where the audience went to meet and greet the panelists. The event was a great success, and an encouraging symbol of the growing interest in the initiative, for which YCELP and Yale Law School are providing critical momentum.
Over the last twenty years, COP accomplishments in qualitative terms are at best modest compared to the urgency and scale of action required to prevent warming of a 3- to 5-degree magnitude. The plight of small islands continues to be largely overlooked, despite the efforts of groups like Islands First. I ponder that perhaps by attending the COP, these vulnerable island states are not only distracting from other efforts, but they are supporting a process in which a worthwhile outcome is politically infeasible. We might, therefore, ask: would islands be better served by not participating in the COP at all and focusing attention elsewhere? And within the negotiations, would their abstention be louder than their input?
Ambassador Stuart Beck of Palau, a small island in the Pacific, is an informed objector to the process. I can’t help but walk away from the 18th COP admiring the Ambassador’s decision, given my own growing feeling that the negotiation outcomes are pre-ordained by the specific instructions assigned to the negotiators from their country leaders back home. If this is truly the case, then through participation alone small islands are validating a broken process. Their validation of the negotiations is important because their sheer numbers help make the COP a democratic and representative process – what deficits there may be in size and resources, small islands make up for in numbers, as AOSIS represents 20 percent of total UN membership. Furthermore, small islands command a moral authority in the negotiations, which stems from extreme vulnerability to the issue at hand. This moral high ground is leveraged throughout the negotiation process through passionate interventions – for example, in Doha, the Philippines appealed to negotiators after their country was struck by a devastating typhoon during the COP.
By abstaining from the negotiations, small islands would send a very clear signal to the international community, that the negotiations have failed to reduce emissions in a timely fashion to prevent severe, sustained, and detrimental impacts to small island nations. Scientific research supports this statement, as the fourth report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identified a global peaking year of 2015 in order to mitigate the worst of the effects for island states. Proactive and creative alternatives, such as the ICJ advisory opinion, will become increasingly viable as the COP negotiations fail to deliver a meaningful reduction in emissions year after year. Given their vulnerable position, it is likely that small island states, and their sympathizers and supporters, will have to pioneer a pathway forward.
Biographical information for the moderator and four speakers on the ICJ panel
Moderator: John Foran
Dr. John Foran is Professor of Sociology and Environmental Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and co-Director of the International Institute of Climate Action and Theory, or iicat.at.
Ambassador Antonio Lima
Ambassador Antonio Pedro Monteiro Lima is the Permanent Representative of Cape Verde to the United Nations. Prior to starting his current appointment in 2007, Ambassador Lima was the Political and Diplomatic Adviser to the President, a post he held since August 2001, while serving concurrently as the Head of State’s Permanent Representative to the International Organization of La Francophonie and Chairman of the National Francophonie Committee. From January 1999 to June 2001, he was stationed in Lome, Togo, as Director of the Communications, Compensation, and Development Fund of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He was the Fund’s Secretary-General from June 1992 to December 1998. He was Secretary of State for External Affairs and Emigration from 1990 to 1991, and served as Director-General for Political, Economic and Cultural Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs between 1988 and 1990. From 1985 to 1987 he was the Diplomatic Adviser to the Presidency.
Attorney Christophe Schwarte is the Executive Director of the Legal Response Initiative (LRI) - a network of lawyers that provides free legal advice to developing countries and observer organisations in connection with the climate negotiations. Before joining the Legal Response Initiative, Christophe worked as a senior lawyer at the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) and served with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for over six years. Christophe is a qualified lawyer with over 12 years of practical experience in different arenas of international environmental law. He holds an LLM from the School of Oriental and African Studies and is a member of the International Law Association's Committee on the Legal Principles related to Climate Change.
Dr. Michael K. Dorsey is Visiting Fellow and Professor of Environmental Studies in Wesleyan University’s College of the Environment and serves as a Director on the Sierra Club’s National Board. From 2010 to 2012, Michael was the Director of Dartmouth College’s Climate Justice Research Project. For more than two decades Michael Dorsey has provided strategic guidance and advice to governments, foundations, firms, and many others on the interplay of multilateral environmental, climate, and biodiversity policy, including for the Clinton administration. He was a member of Senator Barack Obama’s energy and environment Presidential campaign team, and in 2010, Lisa Jackson, the head of the US Environmental Protection Agency, appointed Michael to her National Advisory Committee. Professor Dorsey’s highly cited work seeks to understand how institutional and organizational behavior explain and inform efforts to manage the environment and to effect a just transition to sustainable development.
Dustin Schinn is a second year Master’s student at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies where he focuses on the economics, international policy and governance of climate change. Previous to that, he conducted research in the field of physical environmental sciences at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, the Northern Rivers Institute, and the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute. He became especially interested in sustainable development and climate change through his recent internships at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations and at the Global Environment Facility. For more information please refer to http://environment.yale.edu/profile/dustin-schinn.
Monday, December 17, 2012
By Guest Author, Angel Hsu, Project Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy
This post originally appeared on ChinaFAQs.
Although major greenhouse-gas emitting countries were criticized at the latest round of climate negotiations in Doha for failing to show enough ambition, an event held during the second week highlighted leadership from Germany, China, Morocco, and South Africa on clean and renewable energy. Hosted by Peter Altmaier, Federal Environment Minister of Germany, and moderated by the President of the World Resources Institute, Andrew Steer, the panel also included Xie Zhenhua, Vice-Chair of China’s NDRC, Nandi Mayathula Khoza, Minister of Agriculture of South Africa’s Gauteng province, and Fouad Douiri, Morocco’s Energy and Environment Minister.
At first glance, the mix of countries featured at the high-level event is both surprising and unsurprising. Germany is known for being a global leader in renewable energy. Last year it reduced CO2 emissions 2.4 percent from 2010 levels, and this year boosted the amount of electricity generated from renewable sources from 20 to 25 percent in the first six months. The move away from nuclear power generation following the Fukushima-Daichi disaster has certainly accelerated Germany’s push for having a greater share of its electricity generated from renewable sources; however, this impetus has been matched by leadership from senior officials to maintain Germany’s status as a clean-energy front-runner.
“We organized this event to explain that we are not alone in the universe,” Minister Altmaier said. “What is not so well-known is that many countries around the world have similar efforts and ideas and a lot has been achieved over the last couple of years.”
China discusses achievements, challenges of equitable low-carbon domestic growth
Included in this group of countries is China, which opened the side event with prominent mention of its recent achievements with respect to increasing consumption of non-fossil energy. Minister Xie touted the rise of non-fossil sources in China’s energy consumption to 8.1 percent in 2011 and 27.7 percent of installed power generating capacity using non-fossil sources, among other figures. While Germany may surpass China in terms of installed solar capacity, China led the world last year in constructing on-grid wind power capacity, with an increase of 16 million kW and generating 80 billion kWh. Many of these statistics came from China’s recent Climate Change White Paper, which was released in advance of the Doha meetings.
Minister Xie also mentioned the development of low-carbon growth models in five provinces and eight cities across China, which he stressed is challenging given the “uneven economic development” amongst provinces. He even referenced the application of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities to allocate differential low-carbon targets to these various models – a comment that brought some levity to one of the most contentious issues between developing and developed countries in Doha.
Morocco designs to become net exporter of clean energy
Perhaps the most surprising case of the evening came from Morocco’s Minister Douiri, who announced that his country is striving to become a net exporter of clean energy. This goal is challenging, considering Morocco currently spends about US$11 million (11 percent of the country’s GDP) to import around 95 percent of its primary energy. From an energy strategy issued in 2009, Morocco’s goal is to have 42 percent of its installed generation capacity by 2020 come from renewable sources. 2,000 megawatts will come from solar; 2,000 megawatts from wind, and more than 2,000 megawatts from hydro. Minister Douiri expects that they will be able to avoid 10 million tonnes of CO2. To place these goals into perspective, in 2009 only 4.9 percent of its total energy supply was renewable.
While Minister Douiri did not provide full details as to how the country aims to achieve these goals, he did mention strong support from E.U. partners France and Germany, as well as integration into regional markets that will allow Morocco to export its energy to cover some of the costs. Such efforts were praised by WRI President Andrew Steer, who said that Morocco’s clean energy generation costs are 10 cents per kWh less than what was being predicted a year ago.
“You’re driving down costs, generating 60,000 jobs, and on the way to becoming a major exporter of clean energy,” Steer added.
South Africa challenges itself to reduce reliance on coal
Such a model – if successful – could have lessons for South Africa, which arguably has the most challenges ahead in terms of sustainable energy generation. South Africa has the 14th-highest GHG emissions in the world and one of the most energy-intensive economies due its reliance on mining and minerals processing, as well as coal-intensive electricity generation. According to the International Energy Association, over 90 percent of the South African electricity supply comes from coal, compared to around 65 percent in China and 42 percent in the United States. Therefore, South Africa has more ground to cover, although Minister Khoza did state the country’s goal for 42 percent renewable electricity generation by 2030, reducing the coal-based portion to 15 percent. A mix of public and private funds will help to achieve goals of installing 1 million solar water heaters by 2015 (to date, over 300,000 have been installed); as well as the Khi Solar One Project, which will generate 50 MW of power and create 1,400 jobs.
While South Africa’s commitment was palpable through the words of Minister Khoza and the fact the country hosted last year’s climate summit in Durban, there is no doubt that it will be difficult for the country to meet these goals. In the 2012 Environmental Performance Index, South Africa ranked last amongst countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, in large part due to its poor performance on climate change indicators and renewable electricity generation. Unemployment rates in the country are also at a staggering 25 percent, which is why Morocco’s model of clean energy job creation is particularly relevant for South Africa.
Meeting challenges through teamwork - a Renewable Energy Club?
These evident linkages between the countries present at the event are the foundation for a “renewable energy club,” as Minister Altmaeir dubbed it in the conclusion of his remarks.
“At least 118 countries worldwide have national targets for renewables,” he said. But there are very real challenges to achieving these goals, including how to reduce the costs of integration and installation, how to make investments in renewable energy more attractive worldwide, and how to give a competitive advantage to countries in a “club” for countries like those present on the panel that are proactive and demonstrate leadership. Such a club could foster much-needed alliances in “political and financial power,” in Altmaeir’s words, as well as sharing of concrete tools and strategies. His vision would include annual meetings of club member countries, in parallel fashion to the UN climate negotiations, which are often mired in nuanced technical and legal discussions, as was the case in Doha.
It was refreshing to see a diverse range of countries who are at various points in their sustainable energy trajectories discuss in Doha not only their current actions, but also future plans to tackle climate change through renewable energy. While the Doha talks were not expected to and did not result in much game-changing action, perhaps this idea of a “renewable energy club” for countries will gain traction and be a viable platform by which major emitters can raise the much-needed ambition to combat climate change.
“This event illustrates a potentially game-changing trend: leaders who are impatient with the formal processes forming alliances with others who want to act rather than talk,” reflected Steer. “This is a hugely encouraging development, and one that can in turn, by demonstrating that success is possible, encourage more ambition in the formal negotiating process.”
Tuesday, December 11, 2012
By Guest Author, Nora Hawkins, Yale F&ES '14
On December 5, as part of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy’s ongoing webinar series on Emerging Issues in Shale Gas Development, Florida State Law Professor Hannah Wiseman provided a comprehensive overview of the current legal regimes governing shale gas development, including state and federal statutes, local zoning, agency directives, and the common law.
While shale gas is currently regulated at each of these levels, Professor Wiseman emphasized that states are the central hub in this process because states typically issue the primary permits required to develop shale resources. A significant issue, which Professor Wiseman referred to as the “elephant in the room,” is whether the federal government or the states should take the lead in regulating hydraulic fracturing. (And what the role of local governments should be.) Ultimately, Professor Wiseman suggested that states should continue to play a major role, but she believes that efforts are needed to improve and, to at least some extent, standardize current state regulations.
In her presentation, Professor Wiseman addressed regulatory issues at each phase of the shale gas development process, including regulation of seismic testing, development of access roads and drilling sites, drilling and casing of wells, storage and disposal of drilling waste, water withdrawal, hydraulic fracturing, flowback water, and gas venting and flaring.
This blog focuses on a few regulatory issues that Professor Wiseman discussed in the context of well drilling and casing and hydraulic fracturing. Professor Wiseman’s presentation slides and a recording of her full presentation on "Understanding and Improving Regulation of Shale Gas Development" are available here and here, respectively.
Regulating at the Drilling Stage: Well Casings and Groundwater Contamination
Preventing groundwater contamination is a high priority in shale gas regulation and requires, among other things, effective standards for well casings. In fact, Professor Wiseman noted that one of the most contentious issues that has arisen in shale gas development—the potential for methane contamination of drinking water—is primarily an issue of well drilling and casing rather than of hydraulic fracturing. (Though the term hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” is sometimes used imprecisely to refer to all stages of shale gas development, hydraulic fracturing is but one stage in the process.)
In regulating groundwater pollution from faulty well casings, Professor Wiseman noted that it is crucial to obtain baseline data. If shale gas wells are improperly drilled and cased, groundwater can be contaminated by methane and other pollutants, such as iron, manganese, and dissolved ethane. However, because some groundwater sources have naturally elevated levels of these substances, elevated levels alone are not conclusive evidence of well-related pollution. To address this issue, several states have begun to require water testing both pre- and post-drilling to verify whether well-related contamination of groundwater has occurred.
Due to the so-called “Halliburton Loophole,” which exempts hydraulic fracturing from the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (exept where drillers inject diesel fuel), states are now almost entirely responsible for addressing drilling and fracturing-related groundwater pollution, such as by ensuring that wells are properly cased and cemented. Some states have filled this gap by regulating the types of casing materials that can be used, requiring bond logs, specifying minimum pressures that casings must be able to withstand, setting lengths of time that casings must set before wells can be used, and establishing minimum depths that casings must extend below groundwater.
One regulatory dilemma that Professor Wiseman highlighted is that many states currently apply only narrative standards to shale gas activities. While narrative standards may, on their face, require that certain environmental goals be met (e.g., no leakage from well casings), such standards do not prescribe specific measures (or technologies) to meet their goals, and this lack of implementation guidance can sometimes be problematic for regulators, who must issue permits and assess compliance.
Regulating at the Fracturing Stage: Surface Spills, Air Pollution, and Blowouts
At the hydraulic fracturing stage, one issue that has received considerable public attention is whether or not operators should be required to disclose the chemicals they use during the fracturing process. Professor Wiseman noted that while most states require some type of information disclosure, many do not require full disclosure if drillers consider the chemicals that they use to be “trade secrets.” These limitations create uncertainty about the composition of fracturing fluids, which raises concerns about the full risks of groundwater contamination. Lack of disclosure may also hamper efforts to address surface spills when they occur.
Surface spills are an inherent risk during both the drilling and fracturing phases of shale gas development due to the machinery and chemicals used and stored at the drilling site and the contaminated flowback water produced after fracturing. A variety of spill response laws apply here, including, Professor Wiseman noted, the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) which kicks in if sufficient levels of non-diesel and non-gas contaminants are spilled. But effective prevention of surface spills and, when spills do occur, limitation of their harms also requires pre-drilling measures, such as mandated drilling setbacks from sensitive natural resources. As a precursor to development, some states also require development of spill prevention and control plans and/or mandate that operators obtain environmental pollution coverage in the form of insurance or bonds.
In addition to water quality concerns, well fracturing and subsequent gas production can lead to issues of air pollution. As recently discussed on this blog, states have adopted air quality regulations of varying stringencies. At the federal level, the U.S. EPA also recently issued regulations under the Clean Air Act, which will limit the release of volatile organic compounds.
Two relatively rare but critical risks during the fracturing stage are well explosions and high-pressure emissions of fluids from equipment accidently left open at the surface. To avoid such problems, many states require installation of blowout equipment at well sites, which allows pressure to be controlled and released when necessary.
To learn more about these and other shale gas regulatory issues, you can download Professor Wiseman’s presentation slides here, and view the recording of her webinar here:
Understanding and Improving Regulation of Shale Gas DevelopmentNew Project from YCELP on Vimeo.
Tuesday, December 04, 2012
By Josh Galperin
What Climate Change Can Do About Property Law*
*With Apologies to Professor Doug Kysar
Harvey and Phyllis Karan are lucky that their beachfront home on the Jersey shore suffered little damage from Hurricane Sandy. Not long before Sandy hit, the Army Corps of Engineers completed a dune replenishment project, raising a dune in front of their home and providing protection from the storm surges that devastated much of the coast only one month ago.
In its aftermath, Sandy has sparked discussions about how communities along the Atlantic coast can prepare for the more frequent and more intense storms that may result from climate change. Experts have recommended constructing a sea wall to protect New York City at a cost of perhaps $6 billion, for example. Dune replenishment is a more modest effort to reduce the impacts of major storms.
But, the Karans’ situation demonstrates that even modest efforts to prepare for climate change may be no match for the nuances of property law.
When the Army Corps raised the dunes in front of their home, the Karans lost some of their spectacular view of the Atlantic and a small strip of land on which the new dune was constructed. Because this was a government project on private land, the government was required to pay the Karans compensation for the negative impact that the dune raising had on their property. The government offered $300 the Karans demanded $500,000.
Back when this disagreement arose, nobody predicted that Sandy would cause the devastation that it did, though all of the parties knew that improved dunes would protect beachfront property. To that end, the government argued that any harm to the Karans should be balanced against any benefit (i.e., storm protection) that they would get from the more robust dunes. Regrettably, property law does not account for even the house-saving benefits that the government provided the Karans.
Courts recognize two types of benefits that a landowner might receive from a government project like dune replenishment: (1) general benefits and (2) specific benefits. General benefits are those that the public at-large can enjoy. Specific benefits are those that are unique to only a single landowner. Specific benefits must be unique both in their degree and their nature.
For example, if the government builds a road across a landowner’s property, the public at-large may benefit from faster travel. The landowner herself, who is now very close to the new road, might benefit even more from quick access due to her proximity, but the nature of her benefit—faster travel—is the same for this landowner, her neighbors, and other travellers. In this example, the landowner’s added benefit is unique in degree but not in nature, and is thus a general rather than a specific benefit. Under property law, the government cannot subtract the landowner’s general benefit from the compensation it owes her for taking a portion of her property. On the other hand, if the government needed to drain a swamp to build the road, and by draining the swamp it made the landowner’s remaining land newly arable, then that landowner would also experience aspecific benefit, unique in its nature only to her. In this case the government could subtract the specific benefit of the new farmland from its compensation payment.
In the case of the Karans, the couple clearly benefitted from the dune project, which protected their home from Sandy’s damage. But protecting beachfront property from storm damage was exactly the general benefit that the government intended. Even if the Karans received a larger benefit than homes further inland, that difference is merely a difference of degree; it is not a specific benefit of a different nature.
When Sandy ravaged the Jersey coast, the Karans undoubtedly enjoyed an immense benefit insofar as their home is still standing and largely undamaged, but that is an advantage that the courts could not consider in this case. As such, the Karans benefit twice and get a windfall. The government has saved the Karans’ home and (if a pending jury award is upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court), it must also pay the Karans hundreds of thousands of dollars for the privilege of saving their home.
Looking at the Karans alone, this legal doctrine seems unfair and no doubt terribly frustrating to those flooded by Sandy’s water rather than the govnerment’s money.
Looking at the problem more broadly, the limitations of property law could pose an insurmountably costly barrier to large-scale climate adaptation. At the scale of this particular dune replenishment project alone, 190 homeowners, including the Karans, received newly replenished dunes. If each of these homeowners received $375,000, the amount awarded to the Karans, the local government would need to pay an extra $71 millionover and above the millions of dollars needed to carry out the engineering and completion of the dune project itself. On the scale of the entire Atlantic and Gulf coasts (just two of many vulnerable areas), financing adaptation could quickly become untenable under the strictures of property law.
Yale Law Professor (and Interim Director of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy) Doug Kysar recently authored an article titled “What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law,” in which he argued that tort law, which so far has failed to address the massive threat of climate change, must evolve to account for the human demand for a legal framework and venue that addresses climate harms.
Before Hurricane Sandy, the Karans’ story may not have seemed so astonishing. But now, post Sandy, with the threat of climate-instigated property destruction more obvious than ever, the limits of property law have been laid bare. The legal doctrine that entitles this couple to hundreds of thousands of dollars seems increasingly inappropriate in a changing climate world.
With the Karans’ legal case now in front of the New Jersey Supreme Court, it may be time for jurists to think about what climate change can do about property law.
On December 11, 2012 CBS Evening News ran the following piece on the dune projects along the New Jersey coast.
Monday, December 03, 2012
By Guest Author, Gabe Scheffler, Yale Law School '14
This post was co-written with YCELP Fellow Bruce Ho.
On Wednesday, December 5, from 3-4pm EST, Florida State University Law Professor Hannah Wiseman will present a webinar on “Understanding and Improving Regulation of Shale Gas Development” as part of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy’s ongoing Policy Workshop Webinar Series on “Emerging Issues in Shale Gas Development.”
Please click here to register to participate in this free online event.
As a lead-in to Professor Wiseman’s webinar, this blog focuses on one key area of environmental regulation—the regulation of air pollution from shale gas development—at both the state and federal levels. As Yale Professor of Hydrology Jim Saiers discussed in the Center’s first shale gas webinar earlier this fall, air pollution is one of many potential environmental concerns associated with shale gas development. Shale gas drilling can impact air quality and human health in several ways, including through the release of methane (the principle component of natural gas), which contributes to climate change; nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which can lead to both ground-level ozone and particulate matter (PM), which are in turn linked to heart attacks and respiratory morbidity; carbon monoxide; and hazardous air pollutants, such as benzene. This blog looks at the sources of these air pollutants and regulatory steps that states and the U.S. EPA have taken to limit this type of pollution.
Shale Gas Development and Air Pollution
In February, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported research suggesting that air pollution from natural gas operations in Colorado is much higher than previously understood. While this research is from one area only, and applies to natural gas operations in general rather than shale gas specifically, it raises concerns about the potential air pollution that could occur locally and globally as a result of the shale gas boom.
Air pollution can occur at many stages in the shale gas supply chain, from gas production to transportation, distribution, and use. At the production stage, shale gas wells can “leak” methane and VOCs into the atmosphere during the period between well drilling and hydraulic fracturing and the point at which newly drilled wells are connected to gas collection, processing, and compression equipment and pipelines. While “green completion” technology can be used to capture all or most of this methane and other gases, and thus avoid air pollution, this technology is not always used. In the absence of green completions, gas capture may be delayed until after the initial “flowback” and “produced” water flows out of the well.
In some cases, methane and other gases leaking from newly-fracked wells are burned or “flared.” Flaring converts the gas into less harmful substances, such as carbon dioxide (CO2). In other instances, methane and other well gases are simply “vented,” unchanged, into the atmosphere. Because methane is a much more potent greenhouse gas than CO2, flaring is better for the climate than venting. That being said, flaring is by no means a perfect solution since it still generates climate-polluting CO2, NOx, and other air pollutants.
Methane can also be released at other points in the natural gas supply chain, including from leaks in the pipelines used to transport the gas to market and from local gas distribution lines, as the New York Times recently reported. Dr. Ramon Alvarez from the Environmental Defense Fund discussed these methane leakage issues last month in the second installment of our webinar series. You can read a summary of Dr. Alvarez’s presentation and also view an archived recording of his webinar here.
Beyond methane leakage, other sources of air pollution associated with shale gas development include emissions from the machinery used to drill wells and transport gas and, where gas is used for energy, from the eventual combustion of this gas itself. For example, shale gas drilling involves a significant number of trucks (generally diesel) and other equipment. The internal combustion engines in these trucks, well-drilling machinery, and gas compressors produce air pollution in the form of CO2, NOx, and PM. When natural gas is combusted to generate heat or electricity, it also releases CO2. And while the CO2 emissions from natural gas are lower on a per-unit energy basis than other fossil fuels—e.g., coal and petroleum—the CO2 released during gas combustion still contributes to global warming at non-negligible levels.
Regulating Shale Gas Impacts on Air Quality
While some amount of air pollution from shale gas development is likely inevitable, the types and scales of these environmental impacts can be reduced through regulatory safeguards.
In their paper, “Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing,” Professor Wiseman and her co-author Francis Gradijan discuss current federal and state air quality regulations that aim to reduce this pollution. On the federal side, the EPA has established National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act for “criteria pollutants” (pollutants that are common throughout the U.S.) and technology-based standards for “hazardous air pollutants” (pollutants that are toxic or hazardous to humans).
Shale gas development produces both criteria and hazardous air pollutants. Yet Professor Wiseman notes that because the Clean Air Act focuses primarily on “major” sources, many EPA regulations do not apply to shale gas wells, which, while potentially cumulatively significant, generally do not individually emit sufficient quantities of pollutants to qualify as major sources. Professor Wiseman notes that the EPA may soon redefine its methodology for calculating major sources in a way that could bring more shale gas (and other natural gas) sites within the scope of its regulations although this step has not yet occurred.
There are, however, some situations in which EPA regulations do limit air pollution from shale gas wells. For example, Professor Wiseman explains that even “minor” gas operations may be subject to federal regulations if these operations are located in “nonattainment” areas, which are locations that currently exceed the federal NAAQS and are thus subject to more stringent requirements. Additionally, new gas compressor stations and existing stations that increase their hourly pollutant emissions are subject to technology requirements under EPA’s New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). EPA recently promulgated new NSPS for VOCs emitted from fractured and re-fractured wells, which will eventually require drillers to use green completions.
Nevertheless, the limitations of federal regulations mean that state law may often provide the only applicable air quality controls for many shale gas wells. Professor Wiseman writes that New York and Colorado currently have the strongest regulatory regimes in this respect, but that many states lack regulations to control or even monitor air pollution from shale gas wells.
As can be seen in the following table, air quality regulations for shale gas development in the five states – Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania – with the highest levels of shale gas production in 2010 (the most recent year for which data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration is available), vary widely. These regulations generally apply to both shale gas wells and conventionally-drilled natural gas wells.
(click to download)
The table, which draws from Professor Wiseman’s paper and research conducted by Resources for the Future (in which Professor Wiseman is also involved), shows that four of these five states regulate gas venting to at least some extent, such as by requiring flaring if emissions reach certain levels. However, Texas includes numerous exceptions to these requirements and Pennsylvania’s regulation prohibits venting only in cases “when the venting produces a hazard to the public health and safety” (e.g., due to a risk of explosion).
Most of these states also regulate emissions from other areas of the shale gas development process, though these regulations may be circumscribed in scope or, as in Pennsylvania, subject to significant exceptions.
Given that shale gas development is a relatively recent phenomenon, its air quality impacts—and the effects of specific regulations—are still uncertain. Thus, one key area of regulation is the extent to which states require monitoring and reporting, which can help policymakers better understand air quality impacts and regulatory outcomes. Monitoring and reporting are also critically important for compliance enforcement. Louisiana currently requires monitoring and recordkeeping for flaring and venting of natural gas and glycol dehydrators. Other states, such as Arkansas and Pennsylvania have conducted surveys of air pollutant emissions from shale gas development, which could help improve future efforts. Texas has implemented an air quality monitoring program in the Barnett Shale Area.
Understanding and Improving Regulation of Shale Gas Development
Whether these current regulations will ensure that air quality remains at an acceptable level is a key question for policymakers moving forward and for states that have yet to develop their own approaches to shale gas regulation. On Wednesday, December 5, we will address these issues explicitly as we discuss current local, state, and federal approaches to regulating shale gas’ air impacts; regulation of other shale gas impacts, including on water quality; and the implications of these current approaches for future regulatory regimes through Professor Wiseman’s webinar on “Understanding and Improving Regulation of Shale Gas Development.”
Fracking entails high pressure underground injection of large volumes of water mixed with chemicals, sand, and other substances, a portion of which returns to the surface as “flowback.” “Produced water” is naturally-occurring subsurface water, which also flows out of wells and may contain dissolved solids, metals, organic and inorganic compounds, and naturally-occurring radioactive material.
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
By Guest Author, Angel Hsu, Project Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy
This post was also published by the Huffington Post.
Expectations for the global climate negotiations taking place over the next two weeks in Doha, Qatar, are dismally low, and major political transitions in China and the United States – the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases – further temper hope for any kind of game-changing proposal. So what are the more than 7,000 civil society members and 1,500 journalists(myself included) in attendance going to do to make their opinions count and to hold their governments accountable for accomplishing something in Doha?
Well, there’s an app for that, and it’s called DecisionMakr.
Having attended many of these negotiations in the past, I question the value of emitting carbon to fly halfway around the world to attend another COP meeting. As an observer, I am relegated to the corridors, where I hope to bump elbows with negotiators and deliver my two-minute elevator pitch. I’ve spent hours in the back of general plenary sessions trying to make sense of diplomatese and the carefully prepared platitudes that ultimately restrict nations’ ability to compromise on difficult issues. After two weeks of these meetings, my head is spinning, and it’s challenging to distill what just happened.
When I knew I’d be attending Doha this year, I started thinking about how to make better sense of what goes on at a huge and hectic conference like these UN meetings. Technology – in particular, social media -- came to mind as a potential solution to the problem. I first started blogging and using Twitter while attending the watershed Copenhagen climate negotiations in 2009. With approximately 50,000 observers, nearly 100 heads of state, and close to 200 countries represented, it was chaotic and difficult to keep track of what was happening. With all the high-intensity drama including secret negotiation texts, exclusive back-door meetings, developing countries suspending talks and staging a walk-out, Twitter became an invaluable tool for receiving up-to-the minute updates, crowd-sourced from the multitudes of civil society observers and journalists who were “live-tweeting” events as they were unfolding.
After a conference ends, one is left with hundreds of thousands of tweets, but not a good way to hear the signal through the noise. So I pitched the idea of a smartphone app that leverages crowd-sourcing via Twitter to give observers a way to assess the quality of negotiation statements and policy proposals with ratings that can then be averaged to produce a final score. In this way, both observers and negotiators can have a real-time record of a speaker or country’s actions at a conference, and a ranking that provides an indication of how the public felt about their statements compared to others. In the Environmental Performance Index– a biennial ranking of environmental policy results in 132 countries – we’ve seen how rankings matter and how powerful they can be in terms of galvanizing action among leaders and laggards. I wanted to see if we can generate the same type of data and accountability for negotiators though an app – in a way similar to how user feedback ratings influence how we shop on retail sites like Amazon.com, where we eat using restaurant guides like Yelp.com, and where we travel and stay using feedback from other travelers at tripadvisor.com.
Teaming up with developers and engineers at Pariveda Solutions at the Social Good Forum Hackathon sponsored by AT&T, I developed a smartphone and web application called DecisionMakr that will be the start of a social (and academic) exercise in Doha to see whether we can use technology and social media to hold negotiators more accountable. One singular rating along with a log of all statements and proposals will add greater transparency to these sometimes opaque negotiations. While it is difficult to distill how two weeks or more of deliberations often end in one single negotiation text, the app will provide documentation of the shifting positions of countries to allow outsiders to better understand how the end result came to be. We hope that leaders will see their ratings and feedback, and respond as a result.
The DecisionMakr app will officially launch in Doha on Nov. 26 and is currently available at www.decisionmakr.org and free for download at the Apple iPhone App Store. All of the action can also be followed on Twitter @DecisionMakr.