There are many valuable lessons to be drawn from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the nation's only operational, and mandatory, cap-and-trade program. One worth dwelling on is the effectiveness of RGGI's CO2 emissions cap. Recent analysis suggests this cap is much too forgiving -- not just now, but, more importantly, also over the next two decades.
The whole point of the RGGI emissions cap is to create a market for CO2 emissions from power plants that will ultimately drive down those emissions over time in the most economically efficient way possible. A relatively harder cap - one set below actual CO2 emissions, for example - should make RGGI's tradeable CO2 pollution allowances more scarce and thus more valuable to polluters, resulting in higher prices per allowance than a cap set above actual emissions would. The key idea here is that RGGI's cap on CO2 emissions from its regulated entities - electric utilities basically - creates a new market that has the potential to push those utilities towards low- or no-carbon generation. Where policy makers set the cap can therefore matter a great deal; a relatively tough one pushes harder than a relatively lenient one. This chart, produced on behalf of RGGI, strongly suggests the RGGI cap is not hard enough now, nor will it be hard enough in the future:
The important lines to look at for our purposes are the dashed one - that's the RGGI cap as set by agreement of the RGGI members - and the solid black line - that's both historical and projected total CO2 emissions from RGGI's regulated entities. You can see that presently, the cap is simply way too high (and to be fair, some of that is on purpose). The factors behind the recent massive drop in actual CO2 emissions are several (more on that later). The recession undoubtedly plays a huge part. Nevertheless, the cap just does not appear to be exerting real pressure on utilities right now. Maybe that's not a problem. There's an argument that a soft cap is just fine early on, as we refine and tweak RGGI. That argument might be even stronger in the current economic climate. No need to clamp down on utilities in the midst of the recession.
So perhaps the short-term performance issues of the cap are okay to put aside for the moment. That's not at all true for the long-term performance issues. Here's the major problem, and one policy makers should make an urgent focus of their thinking: According to these projections, the cap doesn't appear to really bite until maybe 2030 or later, and that's just too late in the scheme of things. Climate science tells us we need meaningful CO2 reductions much much sooner than that to avoid catastrophic harms. So what's the point of an emissions cap if it doesn't drive change when we need it? It's time to give serious thought to how best to tighten the RGGI cap to make it better correspond with the scientific reality we find ourselves in.
As oil prices increase and energy security becomes a concern in the US, more is being done to explore cleaner burning fuels such as natural gas. Natural gas has seen big increases in the number of wells and total production as shale gas extraction, in particular, intensifies. The EPA projects that 20% of US gas supply will come from shale gas by 2020.
An EPA report in 2004 found that "there was little to no risk of fracturing fluid contaminating underground sources of drinking water during hydraulic fracturing of coalbed methane production wells." But public concern over the process by which shale gas is extracted known as hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking," has escalated with the growing number of wells. Each well requires the pumping of tremendous amounts of fracking fluid into the earth and, according to the EPA's 2004 report, "[t]here is very little documented research on the environmental impacts that result from the injection and migration of these fluids into subsurface formations, soils, and USDWs." Until last year (when the EPA called for the voluntary reporting of chemicals used in fracking fluids), many of the chemicals used in fracking were unknown. Chemicals now known to sometimes be involved in the process include: diesel fuel (which contains benzene and other toxic chemicals), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, methanol, formaldehyde, ethylene glycol, hydrochloric acid, and sodium hydroxide. Given this situation, the EPA has announced another study to examine the effects of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water and groundwater. The EPA aims to issue preliminary findings in 2012 and a full report in 2014. The draft study plan is available at here.
The disaster in Japan has focused new attention on nuclear power in the United States. Here are the basic contours: At present, the U.S. has 104 nuclear plants in 31 states - producing 20% of the nation's electricity. Of the pending proposals to build 30 new units, it is likely that fewer than seven will be built before 2020. No new power plants have been built in the U.S. since the partial meltdown at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania in 1979. The Obama Administration wants to ramp up nuclear power in the U.S. as part of a plan to increase domestic energy security and meet clean energy targets. In practical terms, that means an investment of $54 billion in U.S. loan guarantees for nuclear energy - loan guarantees are often used to help investors since nuclear power plants are extremely costly to set up, have uncertainty around permit approvals, and often take many years to realize a profit. Read more here.
The House Energy and Power Subcommittee approved a bill on Thursday by Fred Upton (R-Mich.), Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, to halt the EPA’s plans to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Upton claims that the cap-and-trade legislation and other “needless EPA regulations stifle growth, kill jobs, and raise energy costs.” In December 2010, the EPA announced that it would regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants and oil refineries, the nation's two biggest sources of carbon dioxide (accounting for almost 40% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions), beginning in 2011. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 called for the voluntary reporting of greenhouse gas emissions and carbon sequestration activities, but the EPA is now looking to take the next step by actively regulating these emissions. Read more here
By Angel Hsu and Yupu Zhao
In the politics of climate negotiations, which are often steeped in nuance and careful posturing, it’s easy to get lost in translation. On the ground in Cancun, reports have been flying about China’s so-called “game-changing” concessions, which could possibly “buoy” the climate Talks, which are quickly nearing an end. As we’re both on the ground in Cancun, we’re going to try to clear the air and get to the bottom of what exactly the Chinese have and haven’t said in the climate negotiations.
The first “game-changing” issue regards the legal nature or “bindingness” of the commitments China made at Copenhagen last year, in particular to reduce carbon intensity 40 to 45 percent by 2020 from 2005 levels. A Reuters article suggested that China was offering “for the first time to submit its voluntary carbon emissions target to a binding U.N. resolution.”
This announcement immediately made a big splash here in Cancun, with buzz in the corridors of China potentially “buoying” the negotiations. However, various media reports and press statements by Chinese officials themselves have muddled where China stands on this particular issue. Last year in Copenhagen, China committed to make its pledges domestically binding through national law. This move to make their carbon intensity reduction target as part of legally-binding, domestic law has been further confirmed through announcements by senior officials that the goals will be incorporated in the next two Five-Year Plans.
Therefore, from this angle, these statements are what Stern called “nothing new” and “business as usual” in Tuesday’s press conference. But what some here have suggested would be “game changing” would be if China were to submit their pledges to an official Conference of the Parties (COP) decision.
In this view, China formalizing its Copenhagen pledges in a UN agreement under the UNFCCC (such as the Kyoto Protocol) would be a move that developed countries have signaled readiness for but developing countries have not. This is mainly because under the Kyoto Protocol, which is legally binding, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities exempts non-Annex I countries (i.e. developing nations) from requirements to mitigate their climate impacts.
“Earlier, some Chinese officials were reluctant to do so because they thought this commitment would mean a detraction from the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities,” says Roy Lee, a professor of law at Pace University, who has been advocating such an action by China for some time.
However, according to our analysis and conversations with members of the Chinese delegation, these suppositions are based on misunderstandings of what the Chinese were trying to say about their commitments to make their carbon intensity targets part of domestic law.
Liu Zhenmin, the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Director of the Chinese negotiating team, said in an interview with Chinese journalists that foreign news outlets sometimes falsely report on China’s position due to language barriers and translation problems, hinting that China still hasn’t made any commitment to the idea of “legally-binding,” as reported by Reuters.
Opening up to MRV?
The second major concession media reported was on the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of Chinese emissions data and climate mitigation actions. Early last week, before U.S. and Chinese negotiators had officially met, the Associated Press announced that the two countries were close to agreeing on MRV, an issue that proved to be hotly divisive at last year’s Copenhagen climate summit and even in preliminary talks in Tianjin, less than two months before the talks in Cancun began.
However, it appeared that the AP based their premature analysis on softer language by both the U.S. and particularly from China, which was perhaps a strategic move on the part of the Chinese to revamp their image from Copenhagen. Then on Monday, the Associated Press reported again that China had “said all their operations, including fully domestic actions, would be open to international scrutiny.”
This statement, while not entirely inaccurate, is largely misleading. At a press conference on Monday, Xie Zhenhua- the head of the Chinese delegation and Vice Minister of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)- reaffirmed pledges of transparency made in Copenhagen and Tianjin. These included willingness to submit actions receiving support, technology transfer, or capacity building through the UNFCCC process to international MRV mechanisms. In addition, China’s voluntary, domestically-funded actions - which are the main concern of developed countries like the United States - would be subject to review by “international consultation and analysis” (ICA), the official language included in the Copenhagen Accord. ICA has been proposed as a MRV-type transparency mechanism applicable to developing countries that undertake unsupported and voluntary mitigation actions, yet in the view of some countries it is distinct from the more stringent MRV mechanisms proposed for developed nations. The specifics of both MRV and ICA are still vague and options are currently being debated in Cancun without much progress. Therefore, the statements regarding transparency here in Cancun are nothing new.
Some of this media confusion also centers on a proposal attempting to clarify these transparency measures, which was made by India’s Minister of Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh. Ramesh suggested at the Major Economies Forum meeting Nov. 17-18 that countries with a share of global emissions greater than 1 percent (around 16 countries) should submit actions to ICA once every two to three years. When the talks began last Monday, Nov. 29, the Chinese delegation was mum on whether China supported Ramesh’s proposals; while Todd Stern, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, said that the proposal was “light” and lacked enough specifics. In fact in the same press conference, Stern mentioned deliberations regarding MRV represented the least progress to date in Cancun - far from news reports of U.S. and China being close to reaching agreement.
The U.S.’s position aside, where exactly China stands on Ramesh’s proposal, which has been gaining support amongst developing countries since negotiations began in Cancun, is unclear. Shortly after arriving in Cancun over the weekend, Xie met with Ramesh and discussed the proposal for four hours. Despite BASIC countries, which include China and India, deliberating the ICA proposal, it is still unclear as to what extent it receives China’s endorsement. Nevertheless, Minister Xie did suggest that the next step is to discuss the details of the proposal, particularly on the frequency of assessment for qualified developing countries. Xie reiterated the country’s support of the principle of ICA- that it should be non-intrusive, non-punitive, and should respect national sovereignty.
So - are the Chinese changing the game here in Cancun or simply reiterating the status quo? Our assessment is that the most significant factor for the Chinese has been its shift in communication and messaging, which has “softened” their image and subsequently led to the dramatic headlines we’ve seen so far in Cancun. But more on that piece later.
Guest post by Angel Hsu Original post can be found in The Atlantic. Coming away from this past week of negotiations at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change meeting in Tianjin, the sense is certainly that time is not on our side. While delegates from more than 150 countries were charged the task of whittling down options on the table to prepare for heads of state and ministers in Cancun, the talks concluded with dishearteningly little progress, a widening divide between developed and developing countries, and resurfacing tensions between the U.S. and China on climate change. From my observations in Copenhagen to most recently in Tianjin, the acrimony between the US and China appears to still rest on three of the most hotly-contested letters in the climate debate - M, R, and V, which refer to the measurement, reporting, and verification of mitigation actions and financial support. In Copenhagen, China agreed to international verification of actions receiving financing, technology transfer, or capacity building; while also consenting to "international consultation and analysis" (ICA) for its domestic actions, which include a pledge to reduce carbon intensity 40 to 45 percent by 2020 from 2005 levels. At a press conference early in the week, I heard the head of the Chinese delegation Vice Minister Xie Zhenhua say that China was trying to increase transparency and did not have any major problems with MRV - as long as national sovereignty was respected. The differences in viewpoints between the US and China at the talks in Tianjin caused major rifts in the discussions and culminated with the Chinese lead negotiator Su Wei calling the US a "pig preening itself in a mirror." In the classical Chinese idiom where Su derived the comparison, Zhubajie zhao jinzi, li wai bu shi ren - meaning "pig in mirror, not human inside or outside" - the half-man, half-pig character Zhubajie is portrayed as lazy, gluttonous, and idiotic. [my note: anyone who is familiar with China's Journey to the West will know the Monkey King and Man-Pig characters] Needless to say, in Chinese culture, this less-than-desirable comparison is considered an undiplomatic slight. Su's comments in the corridors of the Tianjin Meijiang Convention Center reflect his obvious frustration with what he feels is hypocrisy on the part of the U.S. in the climate negotiations. During a press conference, Su criticized the United States for failing to meet its UNFCCC commitments, particularly in terms of pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to provide financial assistance to developing countries. He said it was unfair for the United States to criticize China and make them the scapegoat in the climate debates when the United States itself "isn't doing anything," Su said. His remarks were counter to a speech Todd Stern, Special Envoy for Climate Change in the United States, gave at the University of Michigan Law School in which he said that China was "spurning" commitments made in Copenhagen, acting as if the agreement "never happened." And there's evidence that the Chinese are working to improve capacity as well as transparency of its measurement and reporting systems. Sun Cuihua, the Deputy General-Director of the Climate Change Coordination Office in China's National Development and Reform Commission announced at a side event that China is currently working on a centralized database of GHG emissions, which would include emissions data from Chinese municipalities and provinces and would eventually become open for the public. Although no specific timeline was given for completion, this is a major announcement, considering the most recent publicly-available data for GHG emission levels of Chinese provinces dates back to 1994. Despite these efforts, the US still pushed China on the MRV issue in Tianjin, which I think could have been a negotiating tactic on the part of the US to deflect attention away from the fact that the Washington still has been unable to pass national legislation on energy and climate change. What perhaps bothers the US most on the MRV issue is the fear that if China indeed backs away from the Copenhagen Accord in the negotiations, its promises of MRV and ICA go along with it. This fear was expressed by lead US negotiator and Deputy Special Envoy for Climate Change Jonathan Pershing. Discussion on measurement, reporting, and verification of GHG emissions even amongst non-government actors has also become particularly sensitive following the Tianjin talks, as I've heard from colleagues here in China that several US-China bilateral workshops planned to discuss MRV have been canceled. So without the two largest climate behemoths talking constructively - and not bickering - what does this mean moving forward to Cancun? First, geographical differences aside, Cancun is not going to be any Copenhagen. The expectations are already much lower -BBC news is contemplating only sending one correspondent to cover the talks, as opposed to around 30 last year. Hopes for a legally-binding deal have long been off the table - I could even sense the difference in Pershing's more relaxed demeanor in Tianjin compared to Copenhagen. Second, the inability of countries in Tianjin to make enough progress on the negotiation text means that some important issues identified in the Copenhagen Accord may not be discussed in Cancun. Bright points at Copenhagen, such discussion on credits from avoided deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), were barely even touched at the talks at Tianjin, which do not bode well for hopes of a decision in Cancun. There is an urgent feeling that Cancun is the last shot for all parties to come up with enough concrete action to maintain the credibility of the process moving forward into the next year. If countries are unsuccessful in agreeing upon enough concrete actions in Cancun, there are rumblings, particularly from the European Union, that some parties might jump ship and try bilateral talks or negotiations through the G-20 or Major Economies forum instead. Unfortunately, if multilateral negotiations do start to disperse centrifugally, the one bilateral relationship that stands to make the most difference on the global climate - the one between the US and China - could be damaged in the UNFCCC process.
Posted by Angel Hsu (Original posting can be found at chinafaqs.org) Having the intercessional UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in China this week – the last stop before ministers and heads of state meet in Cancun for the sixteenth Conference of Parties (COP-16) – provides a timely opportunity for participants to witness firsthand elements of China’s clean energy and climate policies in action. As China has become a world leader in developing and deploying key technologies needed to capture and sequester carbon, the U.S. Climate Action Network (USCAN) and the Clean Air Task Force organized a site visit to GreenGen – China’s first commercial-scale Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) power plant located in Tianjin, approximately an hour’s drive from the Meijiang Convention Center, where negotiations have been underway. GreenGen – a $1 billion project led by China Huaneng – represents a joint venture between seven other Chinese enterprises and has the support of the Chinese government, including the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Science and Technology. U.S.-based Peabody Energy also joined the project in 2007 as the only foreign investor. While the Chinese refer to GreenGen as a “research demonstration project,” visiting the site a mere year away from completion of the project’s first phase, left our group with little doubt that this project means business. The first phase of the IGCC plant will produce a full-sized plant’s 250 MW of power, heat, and synthetic gas (syngas). Li Liangshi, the Deputy Chief Engineer of China Huaneng in Tianjin, said construction of the plant began in 2009 and is expected to be completed by the end of 2011. GreenGen demonstrates multiple IGCC technologies that can hopefully be scaled to simultaneously address several environmental challenges – and not just climate change and energy security. To address criteria air pollutant abatement, GreenGen features pre-combustion technology that will strip pollutants such as SO2 and particulates from the coal syngas, according to Deborah Seligsohn, Principal Advisor to WRI’s Climate and Energy Program. GreenGen’s second phase will implement fuel cell power generation and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology for nearly zero-emission power generation. The third phase of the project is planned for completion by 2016, when the plant would produce a total of 650 MW and 3,500 tons of syngas per day. The presentations by Chinese climate and energy experts here in Tianjin have emphasized the critical nature of technologies like IGCC and CCS for China to achieve its energy and carbon intensity reduction targets, particularly as China will continue to rely on coal for a large portion of energy production. In a presentation on Oct. 5, Professor Jiang Kejun of China’s Energy Research Institute emphasized how crucial CCS is for China to make deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. The emission models for China Prof. Jiang and ERI have been working on assume wide-scale deployment of CCS post 2030. Returning to the context of the negotiations in Tianjin, a big piece of the discussion has surrounded technology transfer from industrialized countries to developing countries, to both mitigate and adapt to climate change. However, China shows the capacity to promote two-way exchange in areas like IGCC and CCS. Huaneng’s Mr. Li said that all of the technologies used for the first-phase GreenGen IGCC are manufactured domestically by Chinese companies, with the exception of the Siemens gas turbine . While China has growing capture experience, it is just beginning to try to actually inject CO2, with the first such injection likely to begin at a Shenhua Coal Liquefaction Company project in Inner Mongolia in the next few months. This latter project has received technical support from a number of US technical organizations, many of which are in the newly announced US-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC). Against the smoggy skyline, I could not help but be impressed by the sheer scale and speed with which GreenGen has emerged within the past year. Seligsohn, who had first visited the site a year ago on a study tour of Chinese CCS sites for American experts, remarked that last year on their visit, the site was nothing more than foundation. Although Mr. Li admitted GreenGen’s price tag was not cheap, he said that if successful, Huaneng plans to roll out many more similar IGCC-CCS plants. And with China continuing to build about 30 power plants a year, according to Jiang, these technologies could have a significant impact on China’s air quality and greenhouse gas emissions. ChinaFAQs Expert Angel Hsu is a doctoral student at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. Her research focuses on Chinese environmental performance measurement, governance, and policy.
Guest post by Angel Hsu, doctoral student at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. I’m blogging live from the Tianjin intersessional meetings of the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the last stop on the way to the big Conference of Parties (COP-16) meeting in Cancun, Mexico this November. The mere fact that China is hosting this meeting is significant for several reasons. This is the first time China is playing host to the UNFCCC climate negotiations, signaling its commitment to the UNFCCC process and the issue of climate change itself. As the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, China continues to demonstrate recognition of its role in the global problem of climate change, hosting the intercessional meetings during its national day holiday – a fitting time for China to demonstrate its nationalism and rising leadership in the climate debates. For many, as NRDC’s Jake Schmidt argues, attending the talks in Tianjin will allow first-hand experience of China’s clean-energy revolution and actions on climate change. The main charge of delegates here in Tianjin is to narrow down the set of options available on the table. As Jennifer Morgan, who heads the Climate Change and Energy Program at the World Resources Institute, said in a recent press conference, a key aim of this task is for delegates to “[reconnect] what leaders did and said in Copenhagen and to formalise that in the UNFCCC into a set of decisions, combined with a clear pathway in the form of a legal document.” Parties will produce “draft decisions” on issues such as adaptation, financing, REDD plus, accounting and verification, mitigation pledges, and technology transfer so that when heads of state meet in Cancun, they’ll be able to quickly move to identify points of common ground on these issues to carry enough momentum into South Africa for COP-17. What can’t be ignored this week in Tianjin is the current state of China-US relations. Recent headlines such as the complaint filed by the US steelworkers union against Chinese clean-energy subsidies and a bill currently being discussed in Congress that would penalise China for keeping its currency artificially low are evidence of the current tenuousness of Sino-American relations. It remains to be seen this week whether such a political backdrop will cloud the climate discussions in Tianjin between the two countries, particularly on issues such as financing, technology transfer and the Measurable, Reportable, and Verifiable (MRV) aspects of actions from developing countries and of commitments and support from developed countries. As you’ll remember from the COP-15 discussions in Copenhagen the United States came in demanding international verification of China’s domestic climate actions, a move that riled and split the Chinese delegation, although China in the end agreed to “international consultation and analysis”. However, according to Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, this agreement to “international consultation and analysis” was only made reluctantly and caused considerable dissension within the Chinese delegation, as it went beyond what the Chinese representatives had in their talking points coming into Copenhagen. Lieberthal contends that the Chinese were unhappy in particular about bringing in the MRV piece into a formal COP-approved process; instead, the Chinese are looking only to bring in elements from Copenhagen that prove useful and basing negotiations in the two-track process of the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan. I’ll be following the MRV issue closely over the next few days, as part of my dissertation research and the reason why I’m in Tianjin as an observer. To make matters worse, the United States also missed an opportunity to engage in high-level climate and energy discussions with the high-level Chinese officials, including NDRC Vice Minister Xie Zhenhua, who – as host of the negotiations – is undoubtedly present and available. While the US delegation is in the perfectly capable hands of Jonathan Pershing, deputy special envoy for climate change, the presence of his boss, Todd Stern, would have given tremendous mian zi (literally, “face;” or figuratively, “dignity or respect”) to the Chinese hosts. The talks would have been prime opportunity for the two climate behemoths to repair some of the ground lost over the last year. Despite the daunting challenges always on the plate at these UNFCCC meetings, I hope that delegates here heed the charge of executive secretary Cristiana Figueres during this morning’s welcome plenary session – “Now is the time to act”, else we threaten to forfeit the credibility of multilateralism in solving the global climate change challenge. More to come … follow me on Twitter at @ecoangelhsu for real-time updates from the Tianjin Meijiang Convention Center.
This video looks back at Earth Day April 22, 1970 and the environmental successes and challenges that Connecticut faces. Over the past 40 years, Connecticut has made great progress in cleaning up our air, waters and lands, preserving open space, protecting fish and wildlife, and protecting the public health. Watch here.
In the run-up to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Maurice Strong, the
Conference’s Secretary General, noted that there are only two
possibilities when the world’s leaders come together: success or real
success. In defiance of this characterization, the Copenhagen Summit in
December turned out to be neither. Although there had been no
possibility of a “beyond Kyoto” treaty for many months, the extent of
the chaos surrounding the negotiations was unpredicted and
unfortunate. Poor management on the part of the Danish authorities
coupled with the undisciplined behavior on the part of various other
parties led to negotiations that spun badly out of control.
Not all the news is bad, of course. After years of failing to
participate seriously in the climate change negotiations, the United
States is finally back in the game. The principle of “common but
differentiated responsibilities” was, moreover, reestablished as the
foundation for any new treaty. China and India signaled that they are
prepared to take action. And progress was made on the important issues
of forest protection, adaptation, and funding for the least developed
Yet Copenhagen has left us with a number of important
lessons that must shape the climate negotiations process going forward.
First, the participation of too many parties is bound to make the
negotiations unwieldy and unproductive. The best path to reaching an
effective climate deal would accordingly involve a set of “pivotal”
states. A group of about 15 nations, selected based on demographic
logic (i.e., the scale of their emissions), bolstered by 5-8 other
countries that serve as representatives of key groups, such as the
island nations, would make sense. Such a core negotiating group should
produce an agreement to present to the rest of the world that provides
incentives for all to participate in the form of funding for mitigation
Second, the science-driven agenda promoted at
Copenhagen by the EU proved not to be sufficient. Reaching an effective
climate deal has clearly become an issue of power politics. Although
good climate policy requires a foundation in good science, climate
change cannot be solved based on science alone. What is needed is
commitment by key countries, including the U.S., China, and India. Such
an agreement, however, will be difficult as long as China remains
hesitant about revealing emissions data—and the U.S. cannot mobilize
for action. In the modern world, transparency is essential, and sound
data, metrics, and indicators are fundamentally good policy. And part
of the challenge in getting the U.S. Congress to vote for a climate
change action plan stems from a fear that major trade competitors, most
notably China, will not take real action. So reporting and verification
mechanisms are critical to having climate change legislation move in
the United States.
Given the challenges that are present both
domestically for the United States and globally in terms of forming a
“beyond Kyoto” agreement, even if the focus is narrowed to a pivotal
group of states, it may now be time to think about a new approach.
While national governments must ultimately work together in forming a
comprehensive solution to climate change, an alternative parallel plan
should involve a more disaggregated set of incentives, implemented on a
country-by-country or subnational basis, directed toward promoting a
post-carbon future. National and local jurisdictions moving forward
after Copenhagen should accordingly work to engage the private sector
in pursuing green energy innovation.
1) Which comes first - the chicken or the egg? U.S. climate bill or China MRV?
One of the biggest headlines today involved Massachusetts Senator John Kerry’s presence at the Bella Center. Senator Kerry (pictured right), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and co-sponsor of the Senate climate bill, urged cooperation and binding action from every country (including China) in a speech early this afternoon that was standing room only. He emphasized the importance of a 2 degree C limit, saying anything beyond would be catastrophic. He also focused pressure on U.S. negotiators, reiterating that “[without] action from the U.S., the world can’t respond the way science says we must.”[UPDATE: China's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs just announced on Thursday (Day 11) at a press conference that China agrees to the 2 degree C limit]
As we’re continually reminded, the negotiations are a frustrating Catch-22: prior to COP-15, negotiations were hinged on U.S. legislation and now U.S. legislators are focused on Copenhagen to provide directive as to what kind of legislation should be passed.Senator Kerry’s speech made clear the importance of the Copenhagen talks on domestic efforts to pass a climate bill. Kerry sees the importance of COP15 decisions (i.e. firm commitments from India and China) in helping the Senate pass a strong and worthy climate bill this spring. He was clear that China and India must commit to MRV, suggesting that the fate of U.S. climate legislation may rest on China’s Copenhagen concessions.
This is an interesting carrot the U.S. is dangling in front of China. As we’ve heard repeatedly throughout the Copenhagen talks, the China wants U.S. action and it seems as if Senator Kerry was suggesting Congress is looking to see what China commits to here before it is willing to enact climate legislation in the U.S. However, in a press briefing this afternoon that was delayed by 90 minutes due to consultations between China and the G-77, lead Chinese negotiator Su Wei revealed that China is ready to wait. Mr. Su said, “In China we have a saying, it’s worth waiting for a feast and we are well prepared to wait for this banquet,” suggesting that China is hungry but not desperate. Chinese climate action is, in yet another Catch-22, contingent on American legislation. S
Our heads are already collectively spinning trying to keep these Catch-22s, chickens, eggs, and legislation straight. But what it all comes down to again, is the big MRV elephant in the room. Senator Kerry again today emphasized that China’s willingness to agree to international MRV is the principle issue for the negotiation’s final days. If China doesn’t agree, Senator Kerry said the U.S. is also considering trade sanctions in the form of carbon tariffs to try to bully China at the negotiating table. Already yesterday (Day 9), we heard Ambassador Yu Qingtai say that China would not stand for any climate-related trade barriers. Mr. Zhu Guangyao, Assistant Minister of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, reiterated this point today (Day 10) but also mentioned that China is considering domestic carbon taxes.
2) Unlocking the deadlock (Pictured below, Chinese climate negotiators huddle to conference after Senator Kerry’s remarks.)
With the clock ticking and negotiations coming down to the wire, what moves by the U.S. and China can help unlock the deadlock that has been slowing down an agreement? David Doniger and Barbara Finamore of the Natural Resources Defense Council suggest that the U.S. and China involve increased finance commitments on the part of the U.S. and greater transparency and international verification on the part of China. Taking cue from Doniger and Finamore, these are two points we’d also like to analyze from our observations at COP-15.
First, with regards to MRV. While we won’t go too much into detail, as we discussed the MRV issue at length in our last post, it seems that much of the discrepancy on MRV positions between the U.S. and China may in fact be due to lack of clarity or something that’s been lost in translation. As we noted, China is not opposed to MRV for actions that are requesting or receive international finance, technology, or capacity building. We’ve heard many top Chinese leaders on the negotiating team, including Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei and Ambassador Yu, stress that China has robust systems of measurement and will work to make their reports “transparent” and “publicly available.” Sound familiar? Could these reports be similar to the national communications required for Annex-I (e.g. developed countries) by the UNFCCC, which include information about all greenhouse gas sources, calculation methodology, and sectors?
As we already explained previously, China (along with South Africa, India and Brazil) have been thinking of transparency measures along the lines of national communications. Mr. Su reitered during this afternoon’s press conference that perhaps the U.S.’s demands for greater transparency regarding China’s mitigation actions could be partly addressed through such national communications, of which China has already submitted its first in 2004 along with other non-Annex I (e.g. developing countries). This communication already includes information regarding China’s greenhouse gas inventory, albeit in much less detail and than is required for Annex I countries. As was decided during their Nov. 14-15 Meeting, Presidents Obama and Hu agreed that the U.S. EPA will assist China in developing its national greenhouse gas inventory, providing a greater level of assurance that the Chinese are accurately accounting for emissions using best-practices and sound methodologies. While it’s been clear in our conversations with U.S. government officials here that this does not mean “supervision” or over the shoulder-looking of China by the U.S. (and thus allaying China’s fears of intrusiveness), this move should provide major headway for the U.S. in terms of the transparency issue.
It is still unclear whether this will be enough for U.S. policymakers. Part of the impasse between the U.S. and China on the MRV question may also be due to a miscommunication issue as well, according to an article by Lisa Friedman of E&E news (subscription needed):
Chinese officials have been under the impression that the United States wants factory-level inspections of their domestic efforts to cut carbon — rather than the macro-level data and clearly spelled-out methodology officials now apparently are making clear they need.
Indeed, facility-level information and verification of emissions data coming out of every smokestack and tailpipe in China would create undue burden on all sides. However, grassroots and NGO efforts to establish voluntary greenhouse gas registries for Chinese businesses and organizations (similar to the Climate Registry in the U.S.) could pave the way for eventual regional or national registries that could ground-truth information the Chinese government provides in its national communications. But the U.S. is still one to talk - even the Climate Registry in the U.S. is not all-encompassing and the fact remains, no climate legislation has passed. China still wins on this point.
Second, with regards to the financing question. As we’ve also heard and witnessed the intricate dancing of Chinese leaders, financing is also a large bone of contention still at hand. In a press briefing, Ding Zhongli, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, responded, “I think the U.S. side could increase its intensity for mid-term emission cuts. At least that level could be consistent with the cuts of the European Union. Second, I hope the U.S. Government could be more generous with finance to developing countries.” Well, sorry Mr. Ding, but the U.S. probably won’t be able to budge on the emissions front, but finance could increase with passage of the Kerry-Boxer Senate bill.In his speech today, Senator Kerry also committed his Senate bill to financial assistance for developing countries.
The developing world is waiting for the U.S. to deliver on its promises of finance, which so far developing countries say developed countries have yet to translate their words into action. Such a move, which Doniger and Finamore say also need to be verified, could also help to grease the negotiation wheels as we speed into the end of Copenhagen.
I have often quoted a Chinese proverb which says that when you are in a common boat, you have to cross the river peacefully together. Well, we are in a common boat. All of the major economies have an obligation to commit to meaningful mitigation actions and stand behind them in a transparent way. And all of us have an obligation to engage constructively and creatively toward a workable solution. We need to avoid negotiating approaches that undermine rather than advance progress toward our objective.
But see this fun explanation of the other historical and cultural dimensions of this Chinese saying.]
With heads of state now arriving, significant work remains while the clock ticks. While parties acknowledge the long term nature of this process, nobody wants to leave Copenhagen empty-handed. Will heads of state be able to hatch a plan to leave with an operational accord in hand, or offer platitudes for a process that failed to deliver?
Team China will most likely not be allowed access into the Bella Center for the final two days. Therefore, we’ll be watching the news and web-streams of events like hawks and provide a final wrap-up at the end.
Team China member and Yale graduate student Alyssa Go contributed to this post. Additionally, Julian Wong provided updates above]
1. MRV - Three Little Letters with Big Implications
We noted from the get-go that whether mitigation actions from developing countries would be subject to international verification (e.g. “measurable, reportable, and verifiable”), would be a critical issue for the Copenhagen talks, particularly in light of demands from Capitol Hill that China must allow for international verification in order for the United States to sign on. China argues, on the other hand, that it has no obligation under the UNFCCC and Bali Action Plan to do so. One of the top headlines on the NY Times today “China and U.S. Hit Strident Impasse at Climate Talks” spoke about the U.S.-China disagreement with regards to the MRV question. This is an issue we’ve heard both the U.S. and China butt heads about this past week.
To set the record straight, we’ve heard various Chinese leaders say that they are not opposed to MRV for mitigation actions that receive international financing, technology, or capacity building support. This includes Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei who stressed that China has its own internal systems for MRV comparable to those of “developed countries” and will make reports coming out of China “transparent” and “publicly available” (see our post “No Country is an Island” for more details on what Vice Minister He said). For actions that receive international support, technology, or capacity building, China says those actions can be subject to international MRV. During a press briefing today, Ambassador Yu Qingtai, China’s Special Representative on Climate Change Negotiations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reiterated China’s stance on the MRV issue, pointing back to the Bali Action Plan and stressing that China will not agree to anything beyond the Bali Action Plan.
“If we are in last stage of negotiations, and there are requirements that go beyond UNFCCC and go beyond BAP, China will not agree,” Yu stated emphatically.
The U.S.’s disagreement with China’s view of MRV probably rests largely on the fact that this language and the most recent revised text for the Long-term Cooperative Agreement (AWG-LCA) provide a loophole of uncertainty for China. The new AWG-LCA 8, item 3 on nationally-appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing country parties released this morning creates either a registry as part of the financial mechanism or some other mechanism to record NAMAs from developing countries, specifying only NAMAs seeking or receiving support would be required for verification through an international mechanism or registry. Here’s where this “loophole of uncertainty” comes into play-because China has implemented actions that address climate change through its Eleventh Five-Year Plan since 2005 and has internally funding all of its energy efficiency measures and mitigation actions (and furthermore hasn’t asked for any funding with regards to their 40-45% reduction in carbon intensity by 2020 from 2005 levels), China would therefore be exempt from international MRV if this text is eventually agreed upon.
We can imagine that this makes U.S. politicians uneasy, as Massachusetts Representative Edward Markey, who co-sponsored the climate and energy bill that passed in June, told the NY Times:
If China or any other country wants to be a full partner in global climate efforts, that country must commit to transparency and review of their emissions-cutting regime. [...] Without that commitment, other governments and industries, including those in America, will be hesitant to engage with those countries when they try to partner on global warming.
As this is the current sticking point in the U.S.-China impasse (reporters asked about verification during every press event we attended today), we would like to pose the question - what options does the United States have if China doesn’t agree to international MRV? As China has said they won’t budge, will the United States? Deputy climate change envoy for the U.S., Jonathan Pershing said during an NGO briefing this afternoon that the U.S. will stand by the request for all parties to MRV, despite China’s concerns of “intrusiveness.” There has been talk of trade sanctions, but Ambassador Yu said today that China will be opposed to any actions by countries to set up new trade barriers under “an excuse of protection the climate.”
2) Message from developing countries: We mitigate, and so can U(SA)!
In a press conference this afternoon ministers from the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) demanded developed countries to match their efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions [pictured right; Vice Minsiter Xie Zhenhua is the right most of the panel up front]. Describing their collective actions–a buffet of technologies, land use policy reforms, and deforestation regulations, the ministers positioned their countries as leaders among both developed and developing nations. The Brazilian minister mentioned that World Wildlife Fund has done the math on the emissions reductions and shown that the policies of the BASIC group achieve significant reductions compared with the developed world. Reflecting on their countries’ reduction plans, the ministers assembled not only saw themselves as good actors in the climate negotiations but also as representatives of all developing countries which have chosen to take deep cuts in the face of projected climate impacts and the high costs of implementing new technologies and policies.
Referring to the current proposals as a “derailment” from the Bali Action Plan, the South African minister noted the absence of deep emissions cuts or significant technology transfer from the developed world. The Indian minister forcefully (and punnily) stated that “the BASIC group is a basic reality” and went on to describe their united front against any manipulation of the process or weakening of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, or Bali Action Plan.
Between the strong words of these ministers, one can see issues worth investigating, especially in light of the MRV debate discussed above. Although focusing his remarks primarily on the two-track approach, the Indian minister also addressed the MRV elephant in the room, saying that the Indian Parliament itself is a “ruthless” method of ensuring appropriate MRV standards and follow-through in their country. That may suffice in India, but the question holds for China, the other BASIC members, and truly every country.
In the halls, Luke ran into Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Chair of the WBGU, and asked him his thoughts on the Chinese position and the negotiations in general. Professor Schellnhuber replied that we could expect China’s actions to be measured and rational while India presented more uncertainty. In his words, “India is the black horse.” His striking response offered even more insight into the BASIC posture: if the MRV position has created an impasse, what more can we expect given the negotiating timeline and the gaps between various positions.
It is clear that developing countries are asking for developed countries to deliver. To make his disappointment clear, Ambassador Yu said in English to the press, “It’s almost word for word, [developed countries are saying] we didn’t meet our targets, but you better accept that as a fact of life. There are no regrets, they didn’t even come up with something like, ‘Sorry, we failed.’”
Team China members and Yale graduate students, Andrew Barnett and Bidisha Banerjee, contributed to this post.
Talks here in Copenhagen threatened to halt today when the African Group, comprised of 53 African nations, walked out of negotiations. We are not too disturbed ourselves, however, as this is all part of the usual “COP-drama,” where year after year, some negotiating group or another walks out or threatens to do so.
Kamel Djemouai, a delegate from Algeria and chair of the African Group, said during a press conference this morning that they are, “definitely, completely disappointed,” with the COP-15 President, the UNFCCC Secretariat, and all developed countries who moved to collapse negotiations for the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA (the two working groups for the Kyoto Protocol and Long-term Cooperative Agreement) into one track. Despite the attempts of Connie Hedegaard, COP-15 President, to draft a list of concerns with the move to focus on the LCA track, the African Group noted that not all concerns had been listed and that such a shift may mean “signing the death of the Kyoto Protocol.”
The African nations stressed “killing the Kyoto Protocol” means losing the only “legally binding instrument that is functioning.” They fear that the tight timeline for rest of the negotiations will mean the clock will run out for discussions on the KP. Along with the Africa Group, China has strongly supported the two-track process for the negotiations so that the KP might persist and commit developed countries to a second commitment period. Developed countries-most notably Australia-do not want to continue the KP because it doesn’t include major emitters like the United States and China.
Fifty African nations have also proposed their own text, which asks for $400 billion dollars from developed countries from 2010-2012 (despite the UN’s estimates that only $30 billion over three years is needed) and steep emission cuts of 50 percent by 2017 compared to 1990 levels - the most in any proposal we’ve seen in COP to date. Because we (or anyone we asked, for that matter) were unable to track down a copy of the text, it is unclear at this point whether the text, even if it materializes, will have an impact at this point given its strong demands.
On another note, Tuvalu’s proposal to establish a contact group for its suggested amendment to the KP, has been officially quashed, despite Tuvalu’s chief climate negotiator Ian Fry’s tearful plea for developed countries to commit to stringent reduction targets.
China’s chief climate change official and head of the Chinese delegation Xie Zhenhua said during a press briefing this afternoon open only to Chinese media that they supported this move by the G-77 and other developing countries for “removing obstacles and speeding up work on amending the Kyoto Protocol.” (While Minister Xie’s address was originally open to the public, an e-mail sent around noon abruptly canceled the event. Only later when we checked up to find out if the cancellation had anything to do with the Africa Group’s walk-out earlier were we told that the event was indeed still on but only open to Chinese media, for which Minister Xie had a “special announcement and communication” for domestic audiences.)
Minister Xie also said he favored the first installment of funding going to the African, small islands, and least developed countries that most need the financing, however not disqualifying China as a potential recipient. An article from Financial Times yesterday jumped the gun when it concluded that China “had abandoned its demand for funding from the developed world to combat climate change, the first apparent concession by one of the major players at the Copenhagen climate talks.” Indeed, the Chinese negotiators, especially Minister He Yafei in our observation, have been very careful and performed an intricate dance around this issue. China knows that the most vulnerable countries, such as the small island countries, should get priority for international funding, but China has not counted itself out of contention for funds in the long run, when $10 billion per year in aid grows to $100 billion per year.
Which brings us to our next update …
2. Who’s REDI for clean tech?
The United States made a splash today with Energy Secretary Steven Chu’s (pictured right) announcement of an international plan to deploy clean technology globally (with a strong emphasis on developing countries)-the Climate Renewables and Efficiency Deployment Initiative (Climate REDI) will include three clean technology programs focusing on solar and LED lighting, efficient appliances and equipment, and policy and technical support for countries planning for renewable energy. The funding for Climate REDI–$350 million in total over five years–comes from funds previously pledged by the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, Australia, Italy, the United States and others (the U.S. share is $85 million). The initiative aims to make energy-saving technology that already exists cheap enough to penetrate markets in India, parts of Africa and elsewhere.
The program also develops Technology Action Plans (TAPs) which share information among MEF members about high-priority clean technologies like solar and wind energy in order to accelerate their development and deployment. The TAPs address over 80% of the energy sector emissions reduction potential identified by the IEA. With these efforts, the United States has made clear its intentions to partner with its peers to develop and deploy clean energy technologies quickly and broadly, but both the Climate REDI and TAP programs lack clarity as to who will receive and benefit from these technologies.
Nearly all MEF members have taken leadership roles on the TAPs, from France with marine energy to Brazil and Italy with bioenergy, but China numbers among those countries not serving in this role. While the Climate REDI program does not omit China from consideration, its absence from a leadership role is noteworthy. Particularly in light of the sharp ping-pong between US climate change envoy Todd Stern and Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, we wondered if this was yet another financing deal in which China was going to be the last kid picked during a kickball game.
However, during a speech today in the US Center at Copenhagen, Secretary Chu addressed this point by highlighting the recent deal Presidents Obama and Hu reached in November. According to Secretary Chu, this bilateral partnership would focus on building efficiency, clean vehicles, and clean coal. He then went on to say that China and the U.S. “have to aggressively share expert information on many of these technologies,” stressing that this could be accomplished partly through intellectual property rights, joint creation and ownership of technologies, and transfer of “know-how” that goes both ways. Secretary Chu’s statements suggest a special, heightened relationship between the U.S. and China that move beyond a typical tech transfer model between developed and developing countries in which technologies, capacity building, and funding normally flow one-way.
Things are getting hairy in the Bella Center. Look at the queue outside the Bella Center this morning!!! Starting tomorrow, secondary passes will be required for all observer (e.g. non-governmental) participants to limit the number of civil society members to 7,000 for Tuesday and Wednesday. Beginning Thursday, this number will be reduced to 1,000 and finally to 90 on Friday. Already, this news has outraged the tens of thousands of non-government participants in the COP, who have already sent a letter of petition to Connie Hedegaard, President of COP 15, and Yvo de Boer, UNFCCC Secretariat, demanding more transparency in the process. Fingers are crossed that Team China will still be given access to the Bella Center, so we can continue to bring you all the action direct from Copenhagen.
Plenary sessions were closed off to observers today, which means that we unfortunately cannot beat the Earth Negotiations Bulletin with insights as to what went down on the negotiating floor. Nonetheless, we were able to get quotes from Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei (seated center; on his left is Su Wei, leading negotiator in the Chinese delegation) - the highest level Chinese government official that has spoken to date (Premier Wen Jiabao is expected next week). We also acquired the text of the big proposal that hit the COP today: “The Copenhagen Protocol” from the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).
1) Is “auditing, supervision, and assessment” (ASA) the new “measurable, reportable, verifiable” MRV?
On the question of “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” (MRV) actions for developing countries (He showed his climate policy prowess by referring to a reporter’s question on “verification” by saying, “You mean MRV-able? I think I just made up that word.”), Vice Minister He first referred back to the Bali Action Plan, which was agreed to by all Parties of the UNFCCC and does not require MRV for developing countries. While sticking to his guns regarding the Bali Action Plan, he said, “It doesn’t mean China would not do what it promises, we’re very serious about it [climate change mitigation actions].”
He then reaffirmed what we mentioned yesterday with regards to “auditing, supervision, and assessment” (ASA) laid out in the BASIC text. He said:
What we have committed to do would first go through our own legal process. There will be a legal guarantee domestically. We’ll also have a regime for statistical supervision domestically. We’re also willing to increase transparency by publicly announcing the results of our actions in reports coming out of China. We’ll certainly do it. There are no problems for transparency. But there will be no MRV internationally because it’s a matter of principle.
Even though we noted in our previous post that this was a significant position for China to take, the reaffirmation by Vice Minister He and the use of the words “transparency” and “publicly” demonstrates a high-level commitment to ensuring that China’s actions to address climate change are credible. He also made a point that these actions are not much different from what current developed countries do (check out this WRI report on National Communications and MRV).
Touché Vice Minister, touché.
As the MRV question is one of the issues ‘Team China’ initially set out to follow, this announcement by Vice Minister He is particularly exciting, when we first drafted our report, China was opposed to MRV of domestic developing country action and commitments. This is an important step for China and it represents recognition of concern from developed countries that the money they put to developing country actions will be used with integrity. However, will this be enough for developed countries? In particular, will the U.S. be satisfied with the domestic ASA put forth by the Chinese, especially given their Bangkok proposal to require all Parties to MRV their nationally-appropriate actions and commitments?
2) No Country is an Island … except if you’re one of the 43 island states represented in Copenhagen.
As we’ve mentioned daily since the Tuvalu snafu on Wednesday, we’ve witnessed a rift on the negotiating floor between China and the G-77. Today, the Alliance of Small Island States, or AOSIS (supporters of whom are pictured left), announced its proposal, embedded below. The AOSIS proposal incorporates elements of the Tuvalu proposal for a “Copenhagen Protocol.” However, one notable omission from the AOSIS proposal is Annex BI, an additional annex proposed by Tuvalu as an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. Annex BI parties would be non-Annex I parties that opt into the annex. By opting into Annex BI, a non-Annex I country (meaning developing countries like China and countries with economies in transition like Mexico) would take on commitments. This would open up China to increased pressure to make commitments. The AOSIS proposal’s omission of the amendments creating Annex BI probably reflects a sensitivity to the strong position China has taken here at COP 15, i.e. to preserve the clear distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, as is the case in the Kyoto Protocol. Ambassador Dessima Williams of Grenada was quick to state that the AOSIS proposal ensures “the survival of the Kyoto Protocol.” Preserving and strengthening the integrity of the KP has been repeatedly stressed by China this week and constitutes a core element of their position. AOSIS definitely wants China’s support.AOSIS Proposal for KP Survival and New en Protocol - Final
But there are some technical elements of the proposal that China has never expressed support for:
(a) AOSIS wants peak global emissions by 2015. China is not ready to talk about peak emissions other than to say, as Su Wei said yesterday, “We hope that the peak year will come soon.” The G-77 expressed concern over peak emission requirements in the Danish text, which put peak emissions in the 2010-2020 range. The G-77’s position is that emissions from developed countries are already projected to peak in the next 10 years, so a global emissions peak in the same time period means the burden falls to developing countries, while for developed countries it’d be business as usual. AOSIS will struggle to gain support for this, except maybe from developed countries.
(b) AOSIS has held onto Tuvalu’s limit of 1.5 degree temperature rise and 350 ppm maximum for atmospheric CO2 concentration. China has expressed support for a 2 degree maximum and has never supported 350 ppm.
The main question is whether China will view the proposal as a threat to the Kyoto Protocol, despite clear statements from AOSIS that it strengthens the KP. It’s possible China won’t support any protocol coming out of the AWG-LCA, no matter what it looks like. China thinks every issue can be addressed within the AWG-KP. This is reflected in the BASIC text, which would put an end to the AWG-LCA within six months.
Vice Minister He did have a few points to make regarding the small island states. First, in response to China’s reaction to the Tuvalu and AOSIS proposals, he diplomatically avoided specifics but did say, “We [small island states and China] may not see eye to eye on some specific aspects. However, developing countries as a whole have the same view. The key to success is for developed countries to deliver. It’s time to deliver.” With these strong words, he continued to express China’s support of small island states, which he noted are the most vulnerable to climate change.
When we asked a colleague who has been working closely with Islands First (an organization that works closely with the UN missions of small island states and that has been assisting many of their delegations here), what he thought of Vice Minister He’s statements, his reaction was quite surprising. ”For the islands, it’s not about the money,” he told us. As Tuvalu negotiator Ian Fry said Wednesday, it becomes a question of national existencefor these island states. All of the billions and trillions in the world won’t do a darn thing if your country is drowning or, worse yet, no longer exists. For the small islands, the focus should be on drastic emission reductions and not a price tag for their existence.
It’s a fair point to which we haven’t yet heard an adequate response.
‘Team China’ is sad to say goodbye to Christopher Kieran tomorrow, but we’ll pick up after a short respite this weekend.
We spent much of today making sense of the reverberations emanating from Tuvalu’s controversial proposal yesterday and the subsequent stalling of the negotiations. We were able to glean some updates through the plenary sessions, press briefings, and our own interpretation of the texts in contention…(Somehow, people have started approaching us for the latest intel on what the “Tuvalu situation” is).
We’re a bit disoriented from all the hoops we’ve had to jump through, but then again so is Su Wei (lead negotiator of the Chinese delegation), who seemed to be in a similar mood during this evening’s press briefing, where he revealed a much more jocular, tongue-in-cheek side of himself that was nowhere to be found during Tuesday’s briefing. At one point, Mr. Su mentioned that he and U.S. special envoy for climate change were friends and that he felt sorry for Stern because he had to answer to the press immediately after stepping off the plane (”Todd, 辛苦了！” in English interpreted by Angel: “Todd, how troublesome, I feel pity”).
But back to the task at hand. A significant shift and softening of China’s initial acrimonious response to Tuvalu’s proposal happened during this morning’s plenary (CMP) session. While China reemphasized their opposition to any proposals that contradict the Kyoto Protocol, they said they felt “very sympathetic about the proposal from Tuvalu,” and were “flexible and ready” to have discussion on some (and not all) of the proposal items, particularly those that don’t serve the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol. Is this a sign that China and the G-77 have made up and are back together? The verdict is still out on this, and, while some have long predicted a China/G-77 split, we do feel that perhaps the relationship is on the mend. In fact Su Wei was more than 30 minutes late to his press briefing this evening because he had just been meeting with the head of the G-77 delegation.
When directly asked what the outcome of his meeting with the G-77 was, Mr. Su responded with diplomatic aplomb, saying that their conversation mainly focused on logistics. While we seriously question whether Mr. Su was really in discussion so heated about logistics that it caused him to be more than half an hour late to his scheduled press briefing, he claimed that China and the G-77 had reached an agreement and wanted to determine the best way to proceed for the remainder of COP-to ensure a comfortable (舒服 in Chinese) environment for everyone.
Now to the nitty gritty - what are these texts and proposals that are being introduced? The BASIC text, below, has not yet been formally presented (it’s floating about in the ether, i.e. places like this blog post, but still doing its part to influence the negotiations). Composed by China, Brazil, South Africa, and India, the BASIC text puts forward a “Copenhagen Accord.” It was written in Beijing in late November, about the same time the Danish text was being drafted. Copenhagen Accord BASIC
We’ll draw a few salient points from the BASIC text that we think reveal something about China’s thinking:
1) Transparency. The real change in China’s position that we detect in the text is a willingness to submit nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) to measurable, reportable, and verifiable standards (MRV), but only for NAMAs financed by developed countries . See Section 5(a). These supported NAMAs would still be voluntary, as would NAMAs financed by China itself. NAMAs not financed by developed countries (”autonomous NAMAs”) would not be subject to MRV. Instead, they would require “auditing, supervision, and assessment” that are “conducted by developing countries themselvesin accordance with their national rules and procedures.” See Section 5(b). This seems to foreclose the idea of China opening up its books to external reviewers…unless they agree to otherwise. However, Section 5(b) also stipulates that even developing country monitoring of autonomous NAMAs must take into account “any guidelines the Conference of Parties may elaborate” and “be made publicly available for full transparency.” The fact that China is willing to submit to some semblance of transparency and accountability at all is new and notable, going a long way in building trust between China and parties such as the E.U. and U.S. who may be suspicious of whether China is actually achieving the results they claim (see Julian’s previous post “Senate Foreign Relationa Hearing: China will not accept caps but must be pushed to MRV“). Still, it is clear from page 8 of the G77 critique of the Danish text (see document embedded below) that G77 perceives a qualitative difference between MRV of developed versus developing countries actions. What this real difference turns out to be will be of great interest.
2) Fate of the AWG-LCA. The text specifies that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) should complete its work, laid out in the Bali Action Plan, by June 2010. It also stipulates that the AWG-LCA chair should not be a member of an Annex I Party. This stipulation is in keeping with the Bali Action Plan, but there’s room for drama here now because some developing countries may not be so keen to conclude the AWG-LCA six months from now because that would imply potentially binding climate action obligations in the very near term. Tuvalu’s proposal yesterday involved the establishment of a new contact group for the AWG-LCA, which would be tasked with drafting a Copenhagen Protocol. If their intention is that the resulting protocol would signal the end of the AWG-LCA’s work, then they should make that clear.
But it still won’t satisfy China, which fears that a second protocol could mean the end of the Kyoto Protocol, notwithstanding Tuvalu’s assurance that the second protocol would complement but not replace the Kyoto Protocol. This is a fear that needs to be thoroughly addressed if the talks are to proceed and be productive, as Mr. Su emphasized during the press briefing. One reporter remarked to us today that China was being “extremely belligerent” in the negotiations. China is definitely trying to work past its severe reaction to Tuvalu’s proposal, smooth things over with the G-77, and push forward toward a significant agreement (remember, China wants a legally binding agreement just like every other developing country). China has made it clear that it will cling to the Kyoto Protocol with all its might. This is because the Kyoto Protocol explicitly places the burden of legally binding absolute emission reductions on the developed world (Annex I countries). This is not to say China is not willing to mitigate its own emissions (it has already announced a carbon intensity reduction target after all), but that it is not willing to go as far as legally binding absolute emission cuts. This is a point that all Parties need to keep in mind as they develop their proposals.
3) Adaptation Assistance. The third point we want to draw out in the BASIC Copenhagen Accord is one that supports a point we made yesterday. The text specifies that a framework for adaptation should promote adaptation primarily in the least developed countries (LDCs), developing small island states, and African countries. We have heard from Ambassador Yu Qingtai and from the Chinese UN Mission Climate Advisor Liu Yuyin that China’s demand for a robust financial structure to an agreement is informed by China’s sense of responsibility in taking a leadership role among developing countries (see previous posts “China in Copenhagen Day 3: It’s getting hot in here - Tuvalu raises the bar, China reacts” and “A Stern Warning?: No Money for China - No Problem“).
Additionally, now that we finally have a copy of the G-77’s official critique of the Danish text (see below), we were able to find some more definitive information about the controversy over emissions “peaking.” The Danish draft, according to the G77 critique, puts forth a global goal for aggregate emissions to peak before 2020. However, because developed countries are expected to peak before 2020 (according to the G-77), this would place additional burden on developing countries to also peak before 2020. Mr. Su again revisited this question from Tuesday’s (Day 2) press briefing, this time taking less of the defensive and saying that China hopes their emissions can peak early and sooner than current predictions (echoing Ambassador Yu’s statements in August, see Julian’s post “Peaking Duck: Beijing’s growing appetite for climate action“). He noted that because of the aggressive policies and measures they’ve implemented since 2007, the growth of their greenhouse gas emissions will slow.
We hope that these points have to some extent clarified key developments in China’s negotiation position today, particularly where texts were almost mysteriously appearing and seem to be distracting from the most critical issue at hand - to arrive at a new climate agreement. In addition to his many sound bytes, Mr. Su eloquently left us with this charge to get us there: “We need to strengthen our confidence, consolidate our consensus, increase our cooperation, and enhance our actions.”
 Note by Julian: It is worth noting that China (and the rest of BASIC) are still stopping short of reflecting their NAMAs in and international agreement. Instead, they only say that they will be “reflected in the National Communications”, which is simply UNFCCC-speak for a periodic submission parties take to update other parties of their actions taken to fulfill their obligations under the UNFCCC, and is not a legally binding instrument.