Climate Action Leadership Council

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Participants

Tov Anderson
William Becker
Carolyn Brouillard
Subhash Chandra
Noha Gaber
Nida Helou
Andrew Huemmler
Karin Jakubowski
Richard Jordan
Marty Krasney
Clayt Lauter
Emily Levin
Bill Marston
Catherine Miller
Christopher Nelson
Stephen Nodvin
Dan Richardson
Frederick Stoss
Larry Toole
Bill Yeates

Overview

• Persuasive rather than formal power. The Climate Action Leadership Council would help to create a broader base of national concern and support regarding climate change action, and would judiciously consider a variety of proposed near-term and long-term strategic actions that their various communities could seek to undertake on the issue. The working group did not seek to create a detailed blueprint for governance that would clarify what, if any, organizational power the Council would have with regard to their own organizations or others that might be seen to fall under the Council’s umbrella, specifically on climate change. The general emphasis appeared to be on the Council’s persuasive influence, rather than its formal power.
• The strong centralized model. At least one member of the working group insisted that the proposed Leadership Council model would likely perpetuate the diffusion of responsibility and ineffectual leadership that has afflicted the climate change issue. In this view, a true centralization of power and funding is needed to prompt a real and dramatic upgrading in the handling of the climate change issue, most likely in the form of a new organization. This organization would be endowed with sufficient resources and probably a non-environmentalist leadership capable of penetrating and mobilizing new segments of society.
• The looser council model. While this proposal for a new organization was carefully considered, the working group appeared to lean toward the looser Leadership Council model. It should be noted that what the two options shared is their emphasis on greater integration and coordination on climate change across many constituencies, rather than the arguably diffuse, non-cumulating efforts that have slowed progress to date. Where the two parted company was on the degree of centralization and resource control required for success.
• Flexibility and coalitional agility. The Leadership Council model was favored, in part, by those who thought it would maximize strategic flexibility and agility. It could, for example, reach out to other leaders to devise political strategies to achieve agreed outcomes but without insisting on inclusion of an overt climate message. The group’s very diversity could discipline it to focus on outcomes, rather than issue entrepreneurship and brandbuilding on behalf of their own organizations. For example, the Council might reach out to coordinate with public health leaders on messages or actions related to the risks of certain power generation sources, or join with labor leaders on a strategy to reinvigorate the auto industry around more competitive cars for a low-carbon future.
• Behind-the-scenes activities. Opinions on how visible the Council should be vary. Some believe that its public profile would be critical to its persuasive impact, while others think it could usefully perform a number of backstage coordination roles to add coherence to what has been a fragmented effort on climate change so far, without threatening the turf of any participating organizations. These roles would include establishment of shared objectives (e.g., contents of national legislation or an international agreement they would favor), message coordination, fundraising and recruitment of marketing talent.
• Kickoff event. The kickoff event for the creation of the Climate Leadership Council could be to convene one or more leadership conferences among a wider group of prominent leaders to ask and address the fundamental questions on climate change: Whose job is it to lead? What is the solution list? What can people do? This would air out key issues, and also provide an audition of sorts – the strongest performers at these meetings would be candidates to be on the Council itself.
• Target audiences. Climate change is most likely to strike a chord with those whose interests are affected by changes already underway that may be attributable to climate change. Messages should be especially crafted to resonate with these groups, and should cover multiple areas of concern, such as health, security, the family, etc.
• Link to the Earth Charter. The Council may want to consider creating a values statement that is linked explicitly to the 1992 Earth Charter, so that it would be grounded in common global ethics.
• Common goal. The Council would specify a common goal that it can rally around, e.g., to achieve near zero net emissions in the United States by a specified date.
• Speaker’s bureau. The Council would create and staff a speakers’ bureau to communicate effectively on climate change, with an emphasis on recruiting locally compelling scientists and other experts.
  
  • Benchmarking. Start by benchmarking against the successes and learnings from previous or ongoing efforts, such as the Greenhouse Network, a training and speakers’ clearinghouse on climate change. Evaluate, for example, the record and experiences of the U.S. National Assessment on Climate Change, which used credible local institutions as staging grounds for their dialogues.
  • Messaging handbook. A glossary and message bible should be developed to assist with communicating climate change science and related messages to different constituencies.
  • Positive messages. The group generally felt that the void of positive messages needed to be filled to strengthen communications on climate change. Projections of doom-and-gloom have, on this account, created audience fatigue, whereas more positive framing with inspiring stories of how the problem is being addressed have been scarcer. Put simply, the message needs to be communicated less as the “sky is falling” and more as the “little engine that could.”